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THE SWEEPING DOMESTIC WAR POWERS
OF CONGRESS
Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash*
With the Habeas Clause standing as a curious exception, the Constitution
seems mysteriously mute regarding federal authority during invasions and re-
bellions. In truth, the Constitution speaks volumes about these domestic wars.
The inability to perceive the contours of the domestic wartime Constitution
stems, in part, from unfamiliarity with the multifarious emergency legislation
enacted during the Revolutionary War. During that war, state and national
legislatures authorized the seizure of property, military trial of civilians, and
temporary dictatorships. Ratified against the backdrop of these fairly recent
wartime measures, the Constitution, via the Necessary and Proper Clause and
other provisions, rather clearly augmented federal legislative power to prevail
in domestic wars. The “Sweeping Clause” grants Congress far-reaching au-
thority to carry federal powers—legislative, executive, and judicial—into exe-
cution. Using this authority, Congress may suspend the ordinary forms of
government and some civil liberties as a means of implementing federal pow-
ers. For example, Congress may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or authorize military trial of civilians if it supposes that such measures
will help ensure that federal authority extends throughout the United States.
Hence Congress has something of a domestic wartime power that permits it to
enact laws meant to defeat rebels and invaders and thereby ensure the con-
tinuity of the Constitution and the federal and state governments that sustain
it.
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[C]ertain proceedings are constitutional when, in cases of rebellion or Inva-
sion, the public Safety requires them, which would not be constitutional when,
in absence of rebellion or invasion, the public Safety does not require them—
in other words, that the constitution is not in it’s [sic] application in all re-
spects the same, in cases of Rebellion or invasion . . . as it is in times of
profound peace and public security.
— Abraham Lincoln1
Introduction
From time to time, Americans (Supreme Court justices included) have
insisted that the Constitution is not a suicide pact.2 Undoubtedly it is not.
While the Founders were not starry-eyed statesmen and must have known
that all regimes eventually expire, they surely did not suppose that the re-
gime they erected would quickly meet the fate of the “perpetual” Articles of
Confederation.3 Those who made the Constitution law erected a “more per-
fect Union,”4 one that was meant to “endure for ages.”5
The difficulty lies in discerning which of the charter’s features were
meant to help it outlast emergencies. After all, a cursory reading of the Con-
stitution intimates extremely limited federal emergency authority. As Justice
1. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Erastus Corning and Others (June 12, 1863), in 6
The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, 1862–1863, at 260, 267 (Roy P. Basler ed.,
1953).
2. E.g., Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting);
Richard A. Posner, Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National
Emergency (Geoffrey R. Stone ed., 2006).
3. Articles of Confederation of 1781, pmbl.
4. U.S. Const. pmbl.
5. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
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Jackson noted, the Constitution lacks anything resembling Article 48 of the
Weimar Republic;6 it never expressly authorizes a raft of crisis measures,
much less suspension of the Constitution.7 Though the federal government
can declare war,8 the subsidiary powers that come immediately to mind—
authorizing war and commanding the use of force9—do not seem to imply
that Congress enjoys a broad wartime power. Two provisions in Article I
mention invasions and rebellions, namely the Habeas and Militia Clauses.10
But the former limits federal power, rather than granting authority that be-
comes available during invasions or rebellions.11 And while the latter clause
grants power, it does no more than authorize the federal government to
summon the militias to thwart invaders and rebels.12 Finally, though the
Guarantee Clause obliges the federal government to defend the states against
invasion and “domestic Violence,”13 it conveys no power to counter inva-
sions or rebellions.14
Hence we know with certainty that the federal government can use the
militia to suppress invasions and rebellions and that the national regime has
duties to the states with respect to both. Furthermore, despite the absence of
any explicit power to suspend the privilege of the writ, there is an unshak-
able sense that the federal government may suspend that liberty. Beyond
these basic conclusions, we are left with seemingly intractable questions. Do
the Habeas and Militia Clauses imply that in cases of invasions and rebel-
lions, the federal government can do nothing more than suspend the privi-
lege of habeas corpus15 and summon the militias, meaning that military trial
6. Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs Aug. 11, 1919, § 3, art. 48 (Ger.).
7. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 649–51 (1952) (Jackson, J.
concurring).
8. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
9. For a discussion of the many authorities that flow from the power to declare war, see
Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Exhuming the Seemingly Moribund Declaration of War, 77 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 89 (2008); Saikrishna Prakash, Unleashing the Dogs of War: What the Constitu-
tion Means by “Declare War”, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 45 (2007).
10. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (Habeas Clause); id. § 8, cl. 15–16 (Militia Clauses).
11. Id. § 9, cl. 2.
12. Id. § 8, cl. 15–16.
13. Id. art. IV, § 4.
14. Id.
15. Scholars have debated whether suspensions of the privilege of the writ grant immu-
nity to those who detain prisoners pursuant to those suspensions. Some have suggested that
when the government suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, those officers who
actually detain might remain liable for damages. In this view, statutory suspensions of the
habeas privilege merely suspend one remedy against indefinite detention (discharge of the
prisoner), leaving others untouched. E.g., Trevor W. Morrison, Suspension and the Extrajudi-
cial Constitution, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1533, 1584–85 (2007). Professor Morrison leaves open
the question of whether Congress can suspend other remedies for what he calls “unconstitu-
tional detentions” in the wake of a suspension. Id. at 1583–84, 1590, 1595. I tend to agree with
Professor Tyler’s argument that suspensions expand executive power and suspend rights re-
lated to personal liberty. Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 Yale L.J.
600 (2009). I would add that because Congress may do more than suspend a particular judicial
remedy designed to secure physical liberty, what really matters is what Congress intends to
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of civilians and military rule are unconstitutional? In other words, does the
expressio unius maxim suggest that the Constitution’s list of permissible
emergency measures is exclusive? And if the federal government can do
more than suspend the privilege and summon the militias during a rebellion
or invasion, where does the Constitution authorize these additional mea-
sures and what else may be done? Even the question of where the federal
government gets its authority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus seems to
pose a difficulty. If in foreign affairs the Constitution is a “strange, laconic
document,” full of “troubl[ing] . . . lacunae” as Louis Henkin observed,16 the
emergency Constitution seems virtually mute, save for the occasional check
on disquieting powers that seem to exist only by implication.17
In fact, the Constitution does not neglect invasions and rebellions,
much less suggest federal impotence during them. The perceived neglect
stems, in part, from the obsession with the Habeas Clause and the sense that
it is the emergency provision in the Constitution. This is misguided. The
Habeas Clause does not begin to tell us the contours of federal emergency
authority. Rather it is a limitation on that power, whatever that power’s
scope. Gauging federal crisis power by focusing on the Habeas Clause is as
backward as gauging the scope of federal power solely by reference to Article
I, Section 9 and the Bill of Rights. The hyperfocus on the Habeas Clause had
caused us to miss the forest for a single tree.
Formed on the heels of two emergencies, the Revolutionary War and
Shays’s Rebellion, the Constitution is not radically deficient when it comes
to domestic wars. To the contrary, it unquestionably augmented the national
government’s powers during emergencies, but it did so in ways lost to mod-
ern eyes. The Constitution addresses emergencies. We just need to decode it
to see how.
When it comes to invasions and rebellions (“domestic wars”), the case
for expansive congressional power is as uncomplicated as it is obscured.
First, the Constitution’s backdrop hints at broad domestic wartime
accomplish when it purports to suspend the privilege. More precisely, the issue is what does
the suspension statute authorize by way of detentions and which remedies, state and federal,
does it eliminate. The Constitution cannot answer such questions.
16. Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution 13–14
(2d ed. 1996).
17. Judges and scholars tend to focus on the Habeas Clause, supposing that it is the
Constitution’s emergency provision. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 650 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (describing it as the only “express provision for
exercise of extraordinary authority because of a crisis”); Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Con-
stitution, 113 Yale L.J. 1029, 1041 (2004) (calling it “a rudimentary emergency provision”);
David Cole, The Priority of Morality: The Emergency Constitution’s Blind Spot, 113 Yale L.J.
1753, 1796 (2004) (calling it “the Constitution’s only explicit ‘emergency’ provision”).
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authority for Congress.18 Backdrops matter because context matters.19 The
Constitution was written against the background of state governments that
endured the Revolutionary War via massive delegations of power to the ex-
ecutive and the short-term suppression of civil liberties. Similarly, the Con-
tinental Congress helped the nation defeat the British via its authorization of
indefinite detentions, trial of civilians before military courts, and a tempo-
rary dictator. In both the states and the national government, legislatures
were sovereign in the Schmittian sense because they decided when the state
of exception existed and hence served as the gatekeepers of exceptional pow-
ers.20 When cautious, legislatures might cede the power of the purse or per-
mit the taking of private property. In more perilous times, they might
authorize indefinite detention, military trials, and military rule. But the pre-
rogative has always been with the legislature.
Second, the Constitution never hints that it departs from this estab-
lished regime of broad legislative authority in emergencies. It never repudi-
ates the emergency measures that served so well during the Revolutionary
War. It never declares that during domestic wars Congress can neither sus-
pend civil liberties nor convey sweeping powers to the executive. Although
the Habeas Clause may seem something of an exception, in fact it imposes a
rather narrow constraint, one that makes clear that Congress may suspend at
least one civil liberty during domestic wars.
Third, the Constitution plainly augmented federal crisis power. Whereas
Congress previously lacked power to suppress rebellions, the Constitution
clearly granted such power. Moreover, the addition of the Necessary and
Proper Clause gave further textual grounding to legislative measures de-
signed to prevail in domestic wars. Laws designed to crush rebellions and
repulse invasions may be necessary and proper for carrying into execution
the federal government’s powers. Congress may suspend habeas corpus dur-
ing an invasion or rebellion not because Article I, Section 9 implies that
there is such a federal power, but because doing so is necessary and proper
for implementing federal powers.21 Similarly, Congress may authorize mili-
tary trial of civilians or declare martial law during an invasion and rebellion
when doing so is necessary and proper for executing federal powers. Finally,
Congress may suspend some individual rights when their suspension is nec-
essary and proper for safeguarding the Constitution (and its system of
18. I have previously argued that the Constitution itself never grants the president broad
emergency authority during domestic wars or otherwise. Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The
Imbecilic Executive, 99 Va. L. Rev. 1361 (2013). As the current piece argues, the Constitution
grants far-reaching domestic war authority to Congress and authorizes the latter to empower
the executive during domestic wars. So while the Constitution itself conveys little emergency
power to the president, it permits Congress to convey such authority during domestic wars.
19. Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1813 (2012).
20. See Carl Schmitt, Political Theology 5 (George Schwab trans., Mass. Inst. of
Tech. 1985) (1922).
21. To be clear, I believe that had the Constitution omitted the Habeas Clause, Congress
arguably would have had broader authority to suspend the writ. After all, the Habeas Clause
does no more than limit when the privilege of the writ may be suspended.
1342 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 113:1337
rights) in the long run. The vital point is that federal powers will certainly
not be carried into execution throughout the United States if rebels or invaders
control some or all of the nation’s territory.
Some scope limitations are in order. First, this Article focuses on do-
mestic wars and says rather little about other sorts of crises, such as earth-
quakes or foreign wars. But it does briefly discuss the possibility that
Congress enjoys a power of “self-preservation.” Second, the Article will not
define “rebellion” or “invasion.” Admittedly, any comprehensive theory
about the emergency Constitution must specify what “invasion,” “public
danger,” “domestic violence,” “insurrection,” and “rebellion” mean.22 Yet
while such definitions would be valuable, they are unnecessary to evaluate
the Article’s limited claims about the scope of legislative power during such
crises. Reasonable people can disagree about whether a rebellion or invasion
exists23 even as they agree about the scope of federal power should either
exist. Finally, the Article will not address whether the courts may second-
guess either congressional judgments about the existence of an invasion or
rebellion or the measures necessary to overcome either. While the arguments
in favor of a sweeping domestic war power might be more palatable if they
presume that courts could review the constitutionality of domestic war legis-
lation, the claims made here do not turn on the availability of judicial
review.
Part I suggests that the Constitution accommodates domestic wars and
introduces the claim that the Constitution authorizes Congress to enact
measures necessary to thwart invasions and rebellions. Part II brings to light
early American practices that indicate the legislature’s dominant role during
domestic wars. Part III returns to the Constitution’s text and argues that
Congress has broad (but not unlimited) power in domestic wars and high-
lights early statutes supportive of that reading. Part IV considers what a
22. The Constitution uses all five terms. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 15; id. § 9, cl. 2; id.
art. IV, § 4; id. amend. V. I regard the latter two (insurrection and rebellion) as synonymous.
Both cover widespread, armed resistance to governmental authority. “Public danger,” used in
the Fifth Amendment, seems potentially broader than invasion or rebellion. “Domestic
[v]iolence,” found in the Guarantee Clause of Article IV, may cover more than rebellions or
insurrections and likely includes situations where one state uses force against another. Cf.
Debates of the Virginia Convention (June 16, 1788), in 10 The Documentary History of
the Ratification of the Constitution 1299, 1311–12 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J.
Saladino eds., 1993) (James Madison claiming that Guarantee Clause covers state-on-state vio-
lence via its use of “invasion”).
23. Such disagreements reach back to the Constitution’s earliest years. In the early stages
of the Whiskey Rebellion, state and federal executives disagreed about what was brewing in
Western Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania Governor Thomas Mifflin refused Washington’s com-
mand to use state authority to direct the state militia to suppress the rebels. The governor
believed that he could use military force only after the ordinary means of law execution proved
inadequate and that no such showing had been made. Letter from Thomas Mifflin to George
Washington (Aug. 5, 1794), in 16 The Papers of George Washington: Presidential Series
514, 514–16 (David R. Hoth & Carol S. Ebel eds., 2011); Letter from Thomas Mifflin to
George Washington (Aug. 12, 1794), id. at 553, 553–59. These disagreements can be under-
stood as differences about whether there was a rebellion as opposed to a group of generally
loyal citizens who, in an act of folly, had thwarted the collection of the federal excise tax.
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broad congressional domestic war power means for the separation of pow-
ers, individual rights, and continuity in government.
I. An Accommodative Constitution that
Empowers Congress in Crises
On one view, the Constitution is relatively inflexible in that it does not
authorize wholesale departures from its ordinary constraints. Call this the
“Rigid Constitution.” Under the Rigid theory, the federal government can-
not, no matter the crisis, suspend rights like the right to a jury trial or the
freedom of speech. After all, the Constitution never expressly authorizes the
government to suspend these rights. The Rigid view further supposes that,
no matter the circumstances, Congress can never delegate legislative and ju-
dicial powers to the executive because the Constitution never expressly sanc-
tions such departures from its basic allocations. In sum, when it comes to
rights and structure, the Constitution is unyielding, “equally in war and in
peace.”24
The Founders would have constructed a Rigid constitution if they es-
teemed the “preservation of civil liberty”25 above all else. Writing in the
midst of the Civil War, one Kentucky jurist insisted that “[t]he intention [of
the Founders] was to grant all powers, deemed necessary for good govern-
ment in any emergency, but, if inadequate, still none other was to be exer-
cised.”26 The Founders “greatly preferred all the evils that might ensue from
the want of power, to incurring the hazard of the abuse of such powers as
were withheld.”27
Another perspective regards the Constitution’s constraints, related to
rights and structure, as meant principally for tranquil times. In extraordi-
nary times, when the fate of the Constitution and the nation hangs in the
balance, many of these checks operate less stringently, or not at all. Under
this reading, the Constitution creates rules that operate strictly in ordinary
times but reveal their suppler nature in domestic wars. As Chief Justice
Rehnquist put it, while the Constitution is not silent in time of war, it does
“speak with a somewhat different voice.”28 Borrowing from Eric Posner and
Adrian Vermeule, we can call this the “Accommodative Constitution.”29
24. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120 (1866).
25. S. S. Nicholas, Martial Law 11 (Philadelphia, John Campbell 1862).
26. Id.
27. Id. Justice Jackson said much the same. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 650 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[The forefathers] knew, too, how [emergency
powers] afford a ready pretext for usurpation. We may also suspect that they suspected that
emergency powers would tend to kindle emergencies.”).
28. William H. Rehnquist, All the Laws but One: Civil Liberties in Wartime
224–25 (First Vantage Books 2000) (1998).
29. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 Stan. L. Rev.
605, 606–07 (2003) (explaining the “accommodation view”).
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The Rigid Constitution appeals to civil libertarians. An Accommodative
regime ultimately may undermine the Constitution because unsavory offi-
cials may generate phony crises in order to seize powers.30 Moreover, even
genuine crises may lead to enduring restrictions on liberty as what was ex-
ceptional becomes normalized.31 Libertarians also might deny that an inflex-
ible constitution will prove inadequate. The federal government has ample
powers over money and the military, giving it all the tools it needs to ensure
its survival. Tampering with the separation of powers or civil liberties during
wars is wholly unnecessary.
An Accommodative Constitution appeals to those anxious about the Re-
public’s possible collapse. Such individuals may believe that the Rigid theory
shortsightedly holds certain principles sacrosanct at the expense of long-
term constitutional viability. In the midst of a fierce domestic war, protect-
ing jury trials and preserving the principle of nondelegation are senseless
should a blinkered focus on them lead to the triumph of rebels or invaders
who are bent on toppling the Constitution.
This Part advances two narrow propositions. First, it argues that the
Accommodative reading of the Constitution is a reasonable one. Second,
relying on previous work,32 it contends that Congress (and not the execu-
tive) may temporarily relax constitutional constraints.
A. The Accommodative Constitution’s Plausibility
Before taking up the claim that the Constitution accommodates emer-
gencies, briefly consider the alternative. The Rigid theory has its merits.33
The Constitution generally does not read as if it establishes rules that do not
apply in domestic wars. Many of the liberties the Constitution protects—
jury trial, free speech, press, and assembly—contain nothing implying that
these rights may be withdrawn or suspended during domestic wars.34 “Con-
gress shall make no law”35 sounds like an unconditional prohibition on Con-
gress making any law abridging free speech, press, and exercise of religion.36
Article III demands that “all” criminal trials “shall be by Jury,”37 while the
30. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 650 (Jackson, J., concurring) (noting that emergency
clauses in constitutions may trigger more declarations of emergency).
31. Deborah N. Pearlstein, Ratcheting Back: International Law as a Constraint on Execu-
tive Power, 26 Const. Comment. 523, 523–24 (2010) (noting that scholars have made such a
claim); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 29, at 610–12 (same).
32. See Prakash, supra note 18.
33. In previous work, I tentatively endorsed some of the arguments favoring a rigid con-
struction of the Constitution. See Saikrishna Prakash, The Constitution as Suicide Pact, 79 No-
tre Dame L. Rev. 1299 (2004). The current Article, based on a more fulsome consideration of
text and history, repudiates many of the arguments made in that earlier piece.
34. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; id. amends. I, V.
35. Id. amend. I.
36. Justice Black was fond of making this sort of claim. See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361
U.S. 147, 157 (1959) (Black, J., concurring).
37. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
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Sixth Amendment stipulates that “all” shall have a right “to a speedy and
public trial.”38
The Constitution’s few accommodative provisions may seem to support
the Rigid theory. Because reasonableness is its touchstone, the Search and
Seizure Clause39 is adaptive. A search that is wholly unreasonable in one
context (peacetime) may be reasonable in others (domestic wars). The
courts have read the Due Process Clause40 to require varying levels of proce-
dure based on balancing the interests of the person facing the loss of life,
liberty, and property against the interests of the government.41 During crises,
governmental interests are more weighty and pressing, permitting the gov-
ernment to use truncated procedures. Because a few of the Constitution’s
key provisions clearly accommodate emergencies, it might be a mistake to
conclude that the entire Constitution bends to accommodate crises.
Relatedly, the Habeas Clause might suggest that when the Constitution
means to permit the suspension of civil liberties, it provides as much. Be-
cause only one clause permits the suspension of a civil liberty, a possible
expressio unius implication is that the Constitution does not permit the sus-
pension of other civil liberties. For instance, the Habeas Clause might sug-
gest that while the government can detain individuals without trial, it
cannot punish people outside the processes required by Article III and the
Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments.
While the Rigid theory has its appeal, it is not the only way of making
sense of the Constitution. Consider the plausibility of the Accommodative
theory, one that imagines that some constraints do not apply in emergen-
cies. The Constitution contains clues hinting that it is accommodative, espe-
cially in the face of invasions and rebellions. Though the Constitution never
specifically vests the power to suspend the privilege of habeas corpus, we
know that Congress can suspend it.42 After all, there is no reason to limit the
occasions for suspension if there is no power to suspend the privilege in the
first instance. By constraining suspensions of the privilege, the Habeas
Clause implies that Congress otherwise would have unconstrained power.
But if Congress has implied authority to suspend the writ perhaps Congress
also enjoys other implied emergency powers.43
38. Id. amend. VI.
39. Id. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”).
40. Id. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law . . . .”).
41. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). For an application of this
test in wartime, see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 528–35 (2004) (plurality opinion).
42. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. More accurately, we know some federal entity may
suspend the privilege. For an argument that only Congress (and not the president) may sus-
pend the privilege of the writ, see Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Great Suspender’s Uncon-
stitutional Suspension of the Great Writ, 3 Alb. Gov’t L. Rev. 575 (2010).
43. See, e.g., Debates of the Virginia Convention, supra note 22, at 1332 (William Gray-
son inferring broad federal power from the Habeas Clause’s prohibition).
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Consider also the Constitution’s implicit exceptions to its rights protec-
tions. The criminal trial provisions of the Bill of Rights and Article III do
not apply to members of the armed forces, despite the fact that the only
express exception applies to the presentment or indictment provision of the
Fifth Amendment.44 As the Supreme Court correctly explained in Ex parte
Milligan, the jury trial right does not apply to soldiers and sailors, despite
the absence of any text specifying as much.45 Just as there are implicit court-
martial exceptions to the Constitution’s jury trial rights, so too might there
be implied exceptions to other individual rights.
The Accommodative theory not only finds support in the Constitution’s
text, it also makes practical sense. Implied exceptions to rights enable the
nation to defeat its enemies during domestic wars.46 In the midst of a war on
American soil, executives may need to rule by decree because domestic wars
often demand swift and vigorous action, something not possible when ante-
cedent, inflexible laws create one-size-fits-all rules. Similarly, military trial of
civilians may be necessary when quick justice is essential. The example made
of rebels or traitors is more vivid when trial and punishment are not drag-
ged out.
I draw the same inference from the Takings Clause, for it clearly presupposes that there is
federal power to take property in the first instance. See U.S. Const. amend. V (“[N]or shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”). Again, there is no need
to specify the limited circumstances in which a governmental power may be exercised if there
is no power in the first instance. After all, one does not erect partial checks on phantom
powers. Hence I disagree with Professor Baude’s well-argued claim that because taking prop-
erty was a “great power” it could be exercised by a government of limited and enumerated
powers only when expressly conveyed. William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain
Power, 122 Yale L.J. 1738, 1741–45 (2013). As discussed later, nothing in the Articles of Con-
federation expressly granted the Continental Congress the power to take private property, but
that body repeatedly authorized takings during the Revolutionary War. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 177, 180. The power to take property was evidently understood to be part of the
power to wage war because it was necessary to prevail in wars. More precisely, the power to
“determin[e] on peace and war,” Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. IX, para. 1, in-
cluded the subsidiary power to wage and win wars, including authority to take property. See
infra text accompanying notes 195–196. With respect to the Constitution, I likewise believe
that Congress continues to have power to take private property whenever doing so is necessary
and proper to carry into execution its powers over the armed forces, warfare, military fortifica-
tions, postal roads, etc.
44. U.S. Const. amend. V.
45. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 123 (1866); see also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 40–41 (1942)
(recognizing that the existence of an exception to the right to a jury trial for army and navy
personnel does not preclude an exception for unlawful combatants).
46. The idea of implicit constitutional powers, duties, rights, and exceptions to those
rights should be familiar, for our constitutional practice is rife with them. For instance, though
the Constitution never says as much, presidents must execute judicial judgments, whether they
come from the Article III courts or the Senate impeachment court. See William Baude, The
Judgment Power, 96 Geo L.J. 1807, 1835 (2008). For an alternative view of presidential duty,
see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law
Is, 83 Geo L.J. 217, 222–23 (1994).
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As noted, a broad emergency power to respond to domestic wars can be
hazardous to a republic’s long-term viability.47 Yet those crafting constitu-
tions might suppose that the choice is between two evils. If they construct a
government too impotent and hamstrung, their edifice might collapse in the
first storm, leading to foreign domination or victorious rebels. This is no
better (and arguably much worse) than making the government too power-
ful in the first instance. As President Lincoln asked in his 1861 speech to
Congress, “Is there, in all republics, this inherent, and fatal weakness? Must a
government, of necessity, be too strong for the liberties of its own people, or
too weak to maintain its own existence?”48
The best way to resolve this tension, constitution makers might suppose,
is to create strict rules that apply in ordinary times but allow departures
from them when there is an existential threat.49 Lincoln saw the Constitution
in this light, arguing that sometimes a doctor must sacrifice a limb to save
the patient.50 He actually overstated the sacrifice. If the loss of limb is tem-
porary, the appendage is not totally sacrificed. When the domestic war is
over, the ordinary rules are supposed to spring back into operation, mean-
ing that any sacrifice should be temporary.51 There is no permanent sacrifice
of the jury trial right, the freedom of speech, or of the structural constitu-
tion, just transitory legislative measures meant to ensure the long-term via-
bility of the Constitution.52
Again, my point is not that the Constitution is clearly accommodative.
Nor is it that the Rigid theory is implausible. The narrow claim is that the
Constitution can reasonably be read as establishing default peacetime rules,
about rights and structure, rules that do not apply with the same severity
during a domestic war.
B. The Legislature as Gatekeeper to Emergency Authority
If the Constitution is accommodative, which branch determines that an
emergency exists and authorizes ordinarily illegal measures that are tempo-
rarily necessary to avoid catastrophe? Arguably, the executive seems best
positioned to learn of an existential threat. Unlike Congress, the executive
47. See supra text accompanying note 27.
48. Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861) (internal
quotation marks omitted), in 4 The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 1860–1861,
supra note 1, at 421, 426.
49. To be sure, some revolutions bring benign, even welcome changes. But every regime
wishes to maintain itself, meaning the question to ask is whether those who construct a new
government will choose to enfeeble it by barring the use of extreme measures that might be
necessary to save it on the chance that the regime’s successor might be more to their liking.
50. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Albert G. Hodges (Apr. 4, 1864), in 7 The Col-
lected Works of Abraham Lincoln 1863–1864, supra note 1, at 281, 281.
51. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 29, at 619.
52. Those who suppose that crises have a one-way ratchet effect in favor of governmental
power, see supra text accompanying note 31, may believe that Lincoln’s analogy better de-
scribes reality. The abrogation of limits on governmental power during crises may seem, to
them at least, akin to an injurious amendment to the Constitution.
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never recesses, making it more likely that he will become aware of an inva-
sion or rebellion first.53 Moreover, the executive branch has eyes and ears
(officers and employees) throughout the nation that report back to the chief
magistrate. The Constitution presupposes that the executive has an informa-
tional advantage, as it demands that the president share information about
the “State of the Union” with Congress.54
As a matter of structure, the executive is built for speed and vigor,
meaning that his branch is less likely to be paralyzed by dissension.55 The
president also might be more apt to render decisions based on the national
interest, as he is elected in a nationwide contest.56 As a matter of text, only
the president takes an oath to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitu-
tion.57 And only he is made commander in chief and granted the executive
power. Perhaps his unique oath and the grants of executive and military
powers suggest that the Constitution establishes a constitutional protectorate
under the president.58
As I have argued elsewhere, this theory—that the Constitution itself
grants the president a host of emergency powers related to habeas corpus,
military trials, and martial law—is beset with difficulties.59 From a design
perspective, the president who can act with information, energy, and unity
of purpose and action may also be the one entity most tempted to go rogue,
to declare an emergency that could lead to the Constitution’s demise.60 If in
the “contest for liberty, executive power has been regarded as a lion which
must be caged,”61 then allowing the executive to declare an emergency and
decide what measures to adopt is to read the Constitution as if it empowered
the lion to release itself.62
When we turn to the Constitution’s text, the case for a constitutionally
granted presidential crisis power fares no better. The president’s oath does
not empower the chief executive. Rather it imposes a duty, requiring him to
53. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Executive Privileges and Immunities:
The Nixon and Clinton Cases, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 701, 713 (1995).
54. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 3, cl. 1.
55. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton).
56. See Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48
Ark. L. Rev. 23, 35 (1995).
57. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 8. In contrast, others take an oath to support the Consti-
tution. Id. art. VI, cl. 3.
58. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev.
1257, 1261 (2004).
59. Prakash, supra note 18.
60. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 649–51 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
61. Daniel Webster, Mr. Webster’s Speech on the President’s Protest: Deliv-
ered in the Senate of the United States 23 (Washington, Gales & Seaton 1834).
62. Cf. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 642 (Jackson, J., concurring) (pointing out that because
President Truman entered the war unilaterally, it seems odd to suppose that he could thereby
clothe himself with emergency powers).
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use his powers, whatever their scope, to protect the Constitution.63 Although
the oath perhaps implies that the president will have some means to “pre-
serve, protect and defend” the Constitution, it hardly establishes that he may
do whatever he believes is necessary to safeguard it.64 If the president other-
wise lacks a sweeping power to take all measures he deems necessary to
counter invaders and rebels, his duty to protect the Constitution does not
change that result.65
The grant of executive power66 and the authority implied in military
command67 do not grant the president an emergency power. Though the
“executive power” encompasses authority to control aspects of foreign af-
fairs, direct and remove executive officers, and execute the laws,68 it fits un-
easily with authority to enact crisis measures because the power to execute
the laws does not imply a power to make (and unmake) them.69 Nor does
the commander-in-chief power encompass broad authority to respond to
crises. Justices have rightly observed that the Constitution makes the presi-
dent the supreme commander of the military, not of society and its
civilians.70
As a matter of constitutional backdrop, none of the American precur-
sors to the presidency—the state governors or the commander in chief of
the Continental Army—were thought to have an emergency power.71 None
had constitutionally granted power to take property, try civilians in military
courts, or appropriate funds. Any such powers came via legislation and
when such legislation expired, so did the powers.72 This meant that legisla-
tures were the gatekeepers of crisis authority and that executives were rela-
tively impotent in the absence of statutory grants of crisis authority. Against
63. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
64. Id.
65. A thought experiment makes this clear. Any supporter of the Constitution, either
civilian or military, may take an oath to preserve, protect, and defend it. But taking such an
oath hardly means that she thereby has acquired all sorts of authority that she previously
lacked, including the authority to suspend the Constitution’s various features. Moreover, some
states during the founding era required their officials to take a similar oath. E.g., S.C. Const.
of 1790, art. IV. To my knowledge no one supposed that each state official thereby became an
omnipotent protector, implicitly endowed with a host of emergency powers.
66. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
67. Id. § 2, cl. 1.
68. Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the
Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541 (1994); Saikrishna Prakash, Removal and Tenure in Office, 92 Va. L.
Rev. 1779, 1815–44 (2006); Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power
over Foreign Affairs, 111 Yale L.J. 231 (2001).
69. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582, 587 (1952) (“[T]he
President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a
lawmaker.”).
70. See id. at 643–44 (Jackson, J., concurring) (noting that the Constitution does not
suppose that the president is “Commander in Chief of the country, its industries and its
inhabitants”).
71. See Prakash, supra note 18, at 1381–89.
72. Id. at 1387.
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this established framework, the Constitution contains nary a hint that it en-
ergizes the executive in emergencies. Rather, by adopting the same phrases—
granting executive power and making the president commander in chief—it
adopts the terminology of executive impotence in crisis.73 That is to say, the
Constitution itself never grants the president a crisis power, even if it may
grant Congress the ability to vest crisis authorities with the president.
Indeed, as compared to the president, Congress is a far more likely re-
pository of any crisis powers. Whatever the scope of the federal govern-
ment’s authority in domestic wars, the Constitution hints that Congress is
the vital player. The power to suspend the privilege of habeas corpus was
long thought of as a legislative power74 and the limitation on its exercise is
found in a section that almost exclusively limits legislative power.75 Until the
Civil War, no American supposed that the president could suspend habeas
corpus. Rather, everyone discussing the matter declared that the suspension
power rested with the legislature, as it had in the states and in England.76
If only Congress may suspend the privilege, thereby authorizing execu-
tive detention, it seems plausible that only Congress can invoke other federal
emergency powers, whatever they are. Indeed, it is hard to fathom why the
power to authorize indefinite detention would be within Congress’s exclu-
sive control, but that the president could unilaterally authorize military trial
of civilians.
Another clue pointing to congressional authority is the president’s
power to summon Congress on “extraordinary Occasions.”77 This power
seems to presuppose that the executive might request legislation. Authority
to summon Congress does not exist so that a president may inform Con-
gress of his extraordinary measures as a courtesy to an inferior branch. For
example, Lincoln convened Congress in 1861 to seek congressional authority
during a crisis.78
A final hint comes from Congress’s authority over certain indispensable
means of handling crises. While the president is commander in chief of the
73. Id. at 1391.
74. Prakash, supra note 42, at 592–94.
75. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9.
76. Prakash, supra note 42, at 601.
77. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
78. While Lincoln had already taken many emergency measures, he also repeatedly sug-
gested that Congress might need to pass some legislation either to authorize such measures
going forward or to retroactively approve some of his measures. See Lincoln, supra note 48, at
429–31 (inviting and suggesting congressional legislation with respect to army and habeas
suspension). In 1797, President John Adams similarly convened Congress to consider measures
against France. See John Adams, Proclamation (Mar. 25, 1797), in 1 Messages and Papers of
the Presidents 1789–1897, at 232 (James D. Richardson ed., 1896); John Adams, Special
Session Message (May 16, 1797), id. at 233, 237–38 (discussing laws that Congress might pass
or revise).
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military and the militias,79 Congress determines whether this office is mean-
ingful. Only Congress can create armies and a navy.80 And only Congress
can decide when to summon the state militias.81 Moreover, Congress also
establishes civilian offices,82 meaning that the president is also dependent in
this regard. If Congress determines whether the president will have a mili-
tary, a militia, and prosecutors—institutions crucial in a domestic war—
perhaps it makes sense to suppose that it also may determine whether (and
to what extent) the president will have domestic wartime authority.83
The plausibility of the claim that Congress has authority to take advan-
tage of the Constitution’s flexibility rests, in part, on its textual foundation.
What is the source of Congress’s authority to thwart invasions and rebel-
lions? The Necessary and Proper Clause.84 It grants Congress authority to
enact legislation necessary and proper for carrying into execution all powers
of the federal government.85 As argued in greater detail later, the Necessary
and Proper Clause seems tailor-made to authorize extreme measures in ex-
treme times. What is necessary and proper in times of tranquility seems
more limited than what might be permitted in times of emergency.
My goals in this Part have been modest. First, I have suggested that the
Constitution’s rules apply more flexibly during domestic wars, an Accom-
modative Constitution if you will. Second, I have argued that if the Consti-
tution authorizes the relaxation of its rules in domestic wars, it empowers
Congress to do so.
Part II demonstrates that the Constitution was enacted against a back-
drop of legislatures that enjoyed broad emergency powers. Part III argues
that reading the Constitution in light of this context strongly suggests that
Congress has extensive authority to thwart rebellions and invasions and to
ensure the federal government’s long-term viability.
II. America’s Early Emergency Constitutions
Constitutions are products of a particular time and place. The context in
which the Founders created the 1787 Constitution—the events that shaped
79. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
80. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12–13.
81. Id. cl. 15.
82. See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[H]e shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges
of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not
herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law . . . .” (emphasis added)).
83. For a similar structural argument against the claim that the Constitution grants the
president an executive privilege, compare Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, A Critical Comment
on the Constitutionality of Executive Privilege, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 1143 (1999).
84. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“[Congress shall have power t]o make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Depart-
ment or Officer thereof.”).
85. Id.
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their perspectives and influenced their lives—helps us divine the Constitu-
tion’s meaning.86 Practice predating the Constitution helps frame how we
ought to read its seeming gaps related to emergencies, domestic wars in par-
ticular. This is especially so given that the United States was born of a crisis,
one that required the sacrifice of treasure, blood, and civil liberties.
When we look to those practices, certain propositions seem reasonably
clear. First, prior to the Constitution, state and national legislatures enjoyed
and exercised broad crisis powers. Legislatures enacted dozens of crisis mea-
sures, including suspending habeas corpus and authorizing military trial of
civilians.87 In extreme cases, assemblies declared martial law, allowing the
executive to rule by decree.88
Second, and relatedly, the legislature served as a gatekeeper of crisis au-
thority. Executives had little constitutionally granted crisis authority. In-
stead, their crisis powers came from statutory grants, meaning that
legislatures decided the scope of crisis grants, their duration, and their geo-
graphic reach.
Third, the emergency measures from the Revolutionary War were law-
ful. Although some quibbled with certain aspects of such legislation, many
more admitted that legislatures enjoyed the ability to enact crisis measures
meant to ensure the viability of the new nation and its constituent states.
A. Legislative Authority over Crisis Powers
As noted, before the Constitution’s creation, legislatures repeatedly en-
acted crisis legislation that authorized the taking of property, indefinite de-
tentions, and military trial of civilians. Such statutes were necessary because
executives, both state and national, lacked constitutional authority to take
such measures. No matter the crisis, executives could not take property, sus-
pend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or try civilians in military
courts.
Legislatures even authorized “martial law.” In enacting martial law, leg-
islators understood that they were emulating the Roman practice of creating
dictators, with the invigorated executives regarded as such.89 To be sure,
86. Sachs, supra note 19. Many suppose that what has transpired since the Constitution’s
creation ought to matter in its interpretation. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, The Living Con-
stitution (2010). I do not wish to quarrel with such views here but only point out that on
many accounts of the Constitution’s meaning, the events leading up to the founding are quite
relevant.
87. See, e.g., Act of May 5, 1781, ch. 7, 1781 Va. Acts 140 (expired) (suspending habeas
corpus); 1 Journals of the Provincial Congress, Provincial Convention, Committee
of Safety and Council of Safety of the State of New–York 1775–1776–1777, at 856–57
(Albany, Thurlow Weed 1842) (authorizing military trials).
88. See infra Section II.A.1.
89. See, e.g., H. J. Eckenrode, The Revolution in Virginia 229 (1916); Debates of the
Virginia Convention (June 9, 1788), in 9 The Documentary History of the Ratification
of the Constitution 1050, 1058 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1990); De-
bates of the New York Convention (June 28, 1788), in 2 The Debates in the Several State
Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 356, 360 (Jonathan Elliot
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martial law might not seem to be “law” at all, but rather something extrale-
gal that may need to be indulged in certain situations.90 Moreover, given
complaints about martial law, early Americans might have seemed implaca-
bly opposed to it.91 But in American governments, martial law arose from
statutes, not from executive decree. It was valid and legitimate law, albeit a
version not to be resorted to lightly. American martial law satisfied the need
to keep the military subordinate to the civil, for a wholly civil authority—
the legislature—authorized it.
Temporary dictatorships were familiar and useful, if alarming. Early
Americans, wedded to republicanism, borrowed from the Roman Republic.
Dictators resembling Julius Caesar were to be feared. But dictators emulating
Cincinnatus—those who surrendered crisis powers once the storm had
passed—were to be lauded. State and national assemblies consciously drew
on the Roman example of temporary dictatorship, aware that someone
thought to be a Cincinnatus might be a Caesar. George Washington was
equated to Cincinnatus not merely because he surrendered military com-
mand at the end of the war but also because he repeatedly relinquished
short-term grants of dictatorial powers.92
1. The State Assemblies
During the war, state assemblies served as gatekeepers of crisis author-
ity. Driven by the exigencies of a fierce war, these legislatures repeatedly
ceded crisis powers to their executives. Most of these laws granted specific
authority, such as sanctioning the taking of property or the detention of
Tories.93 Such legislation was always temporary in nature and often geo-
graphically constrained. Sometimes the laws expired after a set number of
days;94 in other cases, they expired after the legislature reconvened.95 While
the latter rule might suggest a limited period, the possibility that an invasion
ed., 2d ed. Philadelphia, Burt Franklin 1888); Monarchical Tendencies in America, in 13 The
Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 168 (John P. Kaminski
& Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981) (quoting Letter from Philip Schuyler to Alexander Hamilton
(Sept. 10, 1780)); Remarks on an Act Granting to Congress Certain Imposts and Duties (Feb.
15, 1787), in 4 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 71, 77 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1962).
90. See Matthew Hale, The History of the Common Law of England 26 (Charles
M. Gray ed., The Univ. of Chi. Press 1971) (1739) (explaining that martial law was “in Truth
and Reality . . . not a Law” but was to be indulged because of its necessity).
91. See, e.g., The Declaration of Independence para. 14 (U.S. 1776); 2 Journals of
the Continental Congress 1774–1789, at 150–52 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., Wil-
liam S. Hein & Co. 2005) (1905); Letter from George Washington to Lieutenant General
Thomas Gage (Aug. 11, 1775), in 1 The Papers of George Washington: Revolutionary
War Series 289 (Philander D. Chase ed., 1985).
92. See, e.g., John M. Kang, Manliness and the Constitution, 32 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y
261, 310–11 (2009).
93. Margaret Burnham Macmillan, The War Governors in the American
Revolution 203–09, 258–59 (Peter Smith 1965) (1943).
94. Id. at 86.
95. See id. at 73.
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might delay the next legislative session meant that the grant could last
indefinitely.
Occasionally assemblies ceded far-reaching powers to their executives.
Usually these powers were granted to an executive and checked by a council,
with the advice and consent of the latter a precondition of their exercise.96
Some state constitutions had established an executive council and the stat-
utes drew on that existing structure as a means of restraining the executive.97
South Carolina’s delegations were breathtaking. From 1779 to 1783,
South Carolina enacted laws that delegated specific powers to the governor
and council, with a sweeping catchall delegation nested among the specific
grants.98 The statutes often began with a justificatory preamble:
W[hereas], in times of danger and invasion it has always been the policy of
republics to concentre the powers of society in the hands of the supreme
magistracy for a limited time, to give vigor and despatch to the means of
safety . . . it behooves us, for our common safety, to follow such example
. . . .99
The acts went on to grant specific powers over the militia, commercial
transactions, forts, etc.100 The 1779 version’s catchall provided that the gov-
ernor and council could “do all other matters and things which may be
judged expedient and necessary to secure the liberty, safety, and happiness
of this State,” save that the militia could not be made subject to Congress’s
articles of war.101 The 1780 and 1783 versions added an additional excep-
tion—“except taking away the life of a citizen without legal trial.”102 While
the governor ordinarily needed conciliar consent to exercise these extraordi-
nary authorities, the acts permitted unilateral gubernatorial action when the
council could not assemble.103
In his article discussing South Carolina Governor Rutledge’s dictatorial
authority, Robert Barnwell asserts that the legislature perhaps added the
capital exception because of the rumored summary execution of three blacks
in 1779.104 The executions ignited an uproar. To Loyalists, the slayings
96. See, e.g., H.D. Res. of Dec. 21, 1776, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 1776), reprinted in
Journal of the House of Delegates of Virginia 1776, at 107–08 (Richmond, Samuel
Shepherd & Co. 1828); 4 The Statutes at Large of South Carolina 1752–1786, at 470,
506, 567 (Thomas Cooper ed., Columbia, A.S. Johnston 1838); Letter from George Washing-
ton to Joseph Reed (July 4, 1780), in 19 The Writings of George Washington 113 (John C.
Fitzpatrick ed., 1937).
97. See Act of Feb. 14, 1781, ch. 5, 1781 N.C. Sess. Laws 378, 378 (“An Act to Establish a
Council Extraordinary”); Robert W. Barnwell Jr., Rutledge, “The Dictator”, 7 J. S. Hist. 215,
219 (1941).
98. The Statutes at Large of South Carolina 1752–1786, supra note 96, at 470, 504,
567.
99. E.g., id. at 470.
100. Id. at 470–71, 504–06.
101. Id. at 471.
102. Id. at 505; see id. at 567.
103. Id. at 506, 568.
104. Barnwell Jr., supra note 97, at 217–18.
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demonstrated that the rebels did not value the rights of man.105 The furor
may have precipitated the capital exception.106
Barnwell concludes that Rutledge was justifiably seen as a dictator.107
Using his wide-ranging statutory authority, Rutledge punished those re-
sidents who previously had sought and received British protection.108 Even
after they took oaths of American allegiance, Rutledge barred them from
voting and ordered them to serve in the militia on pain of confiscation and
banishment.109 These measures were extremely harsh because people who
had sworn allegiance to the Crown while the British controlled South Caro-
lina had little practical choice.110 Rutledge took many of these measures uni-
laterally because consultation with the council proved impossible.111 A
contemporaneous historian, David Ramsay, agreed that the governor, acting
with the council, exercised “dictatorial powers.”112
South Carolina was no outlier. When events suggested that Virginia’s
executive needed more power, Virginians chose to “suspend the rules”113 and
create what was termed at the time a “dictator.”114 In 1776, this meant the
legislature granted extraordinary powers to the governor, acting with concil-
iar consent.115 The Congress had just fled to Baltimore and the Northern
front had collapsed.116 Believing that extra executive vigor was indispensable,
George Mason supported a motion that “the usual forms of Government
should be suspended during a limited time” for the speedy implementation
of forceful measures to repel an anticipated invasion.117 The Virginia Senate
amended the motion’s preamble, eliminating the reference to the suspension
of forms but left the additional powers intact.118 As enacted, the resolution
allowed the executive to increase the army’s size, deploy it anywhere, and
withdraw from the treasury at will.119
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. Id. at 224.
108. See id. at 221–24.
109. Id. at 221–23.
110. See id. at 222.
111. Id. at 219–20.
112. 2 David Ramsay, The History of the American Revolution 443 (Lester H. Co-
hen ed., LibertyClassics 1990) (1789).
113. John E. Selby, The Revolution in Virginia 1775–1783, at 119, 130 (1988).
114. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
115. H.D. Res. of Dec. 21, 1776 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 1776), reprinted in Journal
of the House of Delegates of Virginia 1776, supra note 96, at 107–08.
116. See, e.g., 6 Journals of the Continental Congress 1774–1789, at 1027 (Worth-
ington Chauncey Ford ed., William S. Hein & Co. 2005) (1906); Letter from Charles Thomson
to George Washington (Dec. 11, 1776), in 7 The Papers of George Washington: Revolu-
tionary War Series 302, 302 n.1 (Philander D. Chase ed., 1997).
117. Va. H.D. Res. of Dec. 21, 1776.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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The next experiment occurred in 1780. In May, the assembly declared
that because of the public danger and the enemy’s rapid progress it was
necessary “to vest the executive with extraordinary powers for a limitted
[sic] time.”120 The executive could call out 20,000 militia and send them out
of state, take property, detain those disaffected from the American cause,
and use military courts to try those citizens who aided any insurrection or
British invasion.121
In the spring of 1781, after the Virginia legislature was forced to flee
Charlottesville and reconvene in Staunton, there was a move to vest even
greater power.122 Delegate George Nicholas moved to appoint “a Dictator . . .
who should have the power of disposing of the lives and fortunes of the
Citizens . . . without being subject to account.”123 Patrick Henry favored the
motion and argued that the executive’s title mattered little, so long as the
powers were adequate.124 Much later, Thomas Jefferson would claim that the
motion lost by six votes.125 Even if Jefferson was right about the particular
motion, its spirit prevailed, for shortly thereafter the legislature granted the
governor, acting with the executive council’s consent, the most sweeping
powers yet. The executive could call out the militia and deploy it anywhere,
impress military supplies, detain anyone, banish suspected Tories on pain of
death, unilaterally extend enlistments, and create substitute criminal
courts.126 In a separate act, the legislature imposed “martial law” within a
twenty-mile radius of any American and British encampments.127
North Carolina embraced similar measures. In 1780, the legislature cre-
ated a Board of War to handle military matters should the legislature be
unable to meet.128 Among other things, the board could empower the execu-
tive to take any measures “necessary and expedient for the public secur-
ity.”129 After the governor complained that the board had usurped his
constitutional authority to execute the laws,130 the legislature created a
“Council Extraordinary.”131 This time the assembly vested power in the gov-
ernor, acting with the council’s consent, “to do and execute every other act
120. Act of May 4, 1780, ch. 35, 1780 Va. Acts 130 reprinted in 10 The Statutes at
Large; Being a Collection of All the Laws of Virginia at 309, 309–310 (William Waller
Hening ed., Richmond, George Cochran 1822).
121. Id. at 310–12.
122. Letter from Henry Young to William Davies (June 9, 1781), in 6 The Papers of
Thomas Jefferson 1781–1784, at 84, 84–85 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1952).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 85.
125. Id.
126. See Eckenrode, supra note 89, at 229.
127. Act of May 5, 1781, ch. 4, 1781 Va. Acts 140.
128. Act of Sept. 13, 1780, ch. 10, 1780 N.C. Sess. Laws 355.
129. Id. at 356.
130. Gov. Abner Nash to the General Assembly (Jan. 28, 1781), in 15 The State Records
of North Carolina 225, 227 (Walter Clark ed., Goldsboro, Nash Bros. 1898).
131. Act of Feb. 14, 1781, ch. 5, 1781 N.C. Sess. Laws 378, 378 (“An Act to Establish a
Council Extraordinary”).
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and thing which may conduce to the security, defence and preservation, of
this State.”132 In a separate act, the legislature allowed incumbent governors
to continue in office whenever a successor could not be chosen.133 Essen-
tially, the legislature erected a statutory bypass of the constitutionally pre-
scribed means of choosing the governor.
At George Washington’s behest, Pennsylvania declared martial law in
the summer of 1780. In a letter to the president of the state’s Supreme Exec-
utive Council, Washington expressed his desire that the assembly would
“vest the [state] Executive with plenipotentiary powers.”134 Three days later,
the assembly obliged.135 It declared “the exigencies which may arise in a state
of war are frequently of a nature that require such sudden and extraordinary
exertions as are impossible for the legislative body to provide for by the
ordinary course of the law.”136 To respond to such urgent needs, the assem-
bly empowered the council to “Declare Martial Law.”137 Although James
Madison believed that the executive council could not take the lives of citi-
zens,138 there was no such exception.139 The council’s president more accu-
rately described the resolve as granting “a power of doing what may be
necessary, without attending to the ordinary forms of law.”140 Washington
rejoiced that the council had “full discretionary power” to do “anything
which the public safety may require.”141
Occasionally, lawmakers enacted emergency laws even before a constitu-
tion was in place. The New York provisional convention, a body drafting a
state constitution, resolved that spies and suppliers of the enemy could face
“martial [l]aw,” meaning they could be tried by military courts.142 Likewise,
132. Id. (emphasis added). These measures created a plural dictatorship. See David
Schenck, North Carolina 1780–’81, at 268–69 (Raleigh, Edwards & Broughton 1889);
Kemp P. Battle, General Jethro Sumner, in 8 The North Carolina Booklet 111, 130 (Mary
Hilliard Hinton & E.E. Moffitt eds., 1908).
133. Act of Feb. 14, 1781, ch. 6, 1781 N.C. Sess. Laws 379.
134. Letter from George Washington to Joseph Reed (May 28, 1780), in 2 William B.
Reed, Life and Correspondence of Joseph Reed 202, 206 (Philadelphia, Lindsay & Blakis-
ton 1847).
135. Reed, supra note 134, at 208.
136. General Assembly of Pennsylvania, Proclamation of Martial Law (June 1, 1780), in
Reed, supra note 134, at 208, 208.
137. Id. at 209.
138. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 2, 1780), in 3 The Papers of
Thomas Jefferson 1779–1780, supra note 122, at 411, 412.
139. See Proclamation of Martial Law, supra note 136, at 208–09.
140. Letter from Joseph Reed to George Washington (June 5, 1780), in Reed, supra note
134, at 209, 211.
141. Letter from George Washington to Joseph Reed (July 4, 1780), in Reed, supra note
134, at 220, 221.
142. Convention of the Representatives of the State of New York, For the Protection of the
State (Apr. 1, 1777), reprinted in 1 Public Papers of George Clinton, First Governor of
New York 1777–1795, 1801–1804, at 690, 690 (Albany, Wynkoop Hallenbeck Crawford Co.
1899). In 1780, the legislature enacted a more narrow statute subjecting spies to martial law.
Act of June 30, 1780, ch. 75, 1780 N.Y. Laws 282.
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months before the first Massachusetts Constitution would sanction the im-
position of martial law, the General Assembly empowered Brigadier General
Peleg Wadsworth to execute “martial law” in Lincoln County,143 part of pre-
sent-day Maine. In a proclamation, the general forbade assistance to the en-
emy on “Penalty of military Execution.”144
Other times, irregular institutions purported to delegate extraordinary
authority. In 1779, the British occupied much of Georgia, preventing the
legislature from meeting and thereby precluding the election of an execu-
tive.145 In this vacuum, a convention of the people assumed power and
granted “supreme authority” to a Supreme Executive Council of its own
creation.146 The council had “every such power as . . . [it] deem[ed] neces-
sary for the safety and defence of the State,” with the proviso that they were
to “keep as near [to] the spirit and meaning of the Constitution . . . as may
be.”147 The council was a plural dictatorship.148
The demand for crisis measures, including martial law, diminished once
peace was struck with England. Yet the need was not eliminated. Anyone
might rebel against established governments, as Americans surely under-
stood. The most prominent rebellion prior to the Constitution (Shays’s Re-
bellion) took place in Massachusetts, where “Regulators” chafed against debt
and tax collection.149 The rebels disrupted courts and generally thwarted the
state government’s writ.150
Initially, Massachusetts was measured in its response. The governor,
James Bowdoin, admonished the rebels and threatened punishment,151 but
to no avail. In late 1786, the General Court (the legislature) passed a Riot
Act152 and authorized the detention of “any person or persons whatso-
ever.”153 The first law authorized force against those who failed to disperse
after having been read the Riot Act.154 The second suspended habeas corpus,
allowing detention until July 1787.155
143. Act of Mar. 25, 1780, ch. 863, 1780 Mass. Acts 397, 399.
144. Peleg Wadsworth, A Proclamation (Apr. 18, 1780), in 18 Documentary History of
the State of Maine 222, 223 (James Phinney Baxter ed., 1914).
145. 1 The Revolutionary Records of the State of Georgia 400–01 (Allen D. Can-
dler ed., 1908).
146. Id. at 403–04.
147. Id. at 404–05.
148. James F. Cook, The Governors of Georgia, 1754–2004, at 29 (3d ed. 2005).
149. See Leonard L. Richards, Shays’s Rebellion: The American Revolution’s Final
Battle 63, 87–88, 117 (2002).
150. Id. at 9–12.
151. See David Brion Davis & Steven Mintz, The Boisterous Sea of Liberty 227
(1998).
152. Act of Oct. 28, 1786, ch. 38, 1786 Mass. Acts 87, 87–88 .
153. See Act of Nov. 10, 1786, ch. 41, 1786 Mass. Acts 102, 102–03.
154. Mass. Act of Oct. 28, 1786.
155. Mass. Act of Nov. 10, 1786.
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After these measures proved insufficient the legislature issued a declara-
tion. “[I]n conformity to their oaths[,] [a]nd by virtue of the authority
vested in them by the Constitution,” the legislature declared that a “horrid
and unnatural Rebellion and War” had been waged against the common-
wealth.156 The legislature said that “all the power of the Commonwealth”
would be used to suppress the rebellion.157
At first glance the declaration seems pointless, for it did no more than
declare that a rebellion existed,158 a conclusion that observers must have
reached without its aid. But its significance comes into focus when we con-
sider it in light of the Massachusetts Constitution. The latter provided that
martial law could not be imposed on civilians except by legislative author-
ity.159 The proclamation indirectly authorized as much. As Rufus King noted,
because the general court had declared a rebellion, “the powers of the Gov-
ernor, by our Constitution, become almost absolute.”160 The governor could
now “exercise Law martial” and treat the rebels as “open Enemies.”161 King
evidently read the declaration as a legislative imposition of martial law on
civilians.162 A letter from the general court to Governor Bowdoin suggested
the same.163 The legislature declared a rebellion to ensure that the governor
would “be possessed of the full power of the Constitution,”164 likely an ob-
lique reference to martial law.165
From America’s beginnings until its constitutional transformation in
1787, state legislators served as the gatekeepers of crisis authority. When
confronted by invaders or rebels, these legislatures delegated sweeping au-
thority to their executives, laws that swept aside structural and individual
rights limitations found in state constitutions. State assemblies authorized
their executives to seize property, detain indefinitely, try civilians in military
courts, and rule by decree, measures meant to ensure the long-term survival
of the state republics.
156. Declaration of Feb. 4, 1787, ch. 5, 1787 Mass. Acts 424, 425 (emphasis omitted).
157. Id. at 425–26.
158. Id. at 424–26.
159. Mass. Const. pt. 1, art. XXVIII.
160. Letter from Rufus King to Henry Lee? (Feb. 10, 1787), in 24 Letters of Delegates
to Congress 1774–1789, at 86, 87 (Paul H. Smith ed., 1996).
161. Id.
162. See Mass. Const. pt. 1, art. XXVIII; see also Ronald M. Peters, Jr., The Massa-
chusetts Constitution of 1780: A Social Compact 55 (1978).
163. Address of the General Court (Feb. 4, 1787), ch. 6, 1787 Mass. Acts 426, 426.
164. Id. at 426.
165. Correspondence from General Benjamin Lincoln of Massachusetts in January of 1787
also linked a declaration of rebellion with martial law. Letter from Benjamin Lincoln, Jr. to
George Washington (Jan. 24, 1787), in 4 The Papers of George Washington: Confedera-
tion Series 538, 539 (W.W. Abbot ed., 1995) (“The General Court will meet the next week
and if the western counties continue obstinate a rebellion will probably be declared & martial
law put in force.”).
1360 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 113:1337
2. The Continental Congress
Confronting the same perils as the states—the superiority of the British
Army, a host of spies, and a population of dubious loyalty—the Continental
Congress reacted in much the same way. It conveyed detention authority. It
subjected civilians to military trial. And it granted sweeping powers to its
commander in chief. These delegations were so extensive that many believed
Congress had made George Washington a dictator.166
Early resolves applied military justice to civilians. The nation’s first Arti-
cles of War, a code of military discipline, extended military law to “suttlers
[sic] and retailers to a camp, and all persons whatsoever, serving with the
Continental Army in the field.”167 Additionally, courts-martial could punish
all those contemptuous of their proceedings.168 Perhaps the extension to the
army’s civilian retinue could be justified as an appropriate and necessary
regulation of the military’s immediate associates.169 And maybe the power to
punish contemnors was part of the inherent authority granted to all tribu-
nals, military and civil.170 But Congress thereafter resolved that spies lurking
around or in military camps and fortifications could be tried by court-mar-
tial.171 A broader resolve, part of a revised Articles of War, subjected anyone
who supplied intelligence, money, food, ammunition, or shelter to the en-
emy to court-martial.172 Of course, most such fifth columnists were not part
of an army’s retinue, rendering the Continental Congress’s regulatory power
over the army insufficient as a justification.173 By enacting these harsh rules,
Congress had asserted a power to try civilians before military courts. And
Congress made clear why severe measures were necessary: “it has been
found, by the experience of all states, that, in times of invasion, the process
of the municipal law is too feeble and dilatory to bring to a condign and
exemplary punishment persons guilty” of traitorous practices.174
166. See infra text accompanying notes 188–194.
167. Journals of the Continental Congress 1774–1789, supra note 91, at 116.
168. Id. at 118.
169. Because the Articles of Confederation granted Congress authority to govern and reg-
ulate the army and navy, Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. IX, para. 4 (giving Con-
gress the power to make “rules for the government and regulation of the said land and naval
forces”), perhaps that authority encompassed authority over the military’s civilian retinue.
170. See, e.g., Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1873) (“The power to pun-
ish for contempts is inherent in all courts.”).
171. 5 Journals of the Continental Congress 1774–1789, supra note 116, at 693.
This resolve was limited to persons not members of, or owing allegiance to, any of the United
States of America. Id.
172. Id. at 799. Whereas almost all provisions were expressly limited to officers, soldiers,
or members of the armed forces of the United States, these provisions conspicuously left out
such qualifiers. See id. art. 17–19 (providing that “whosoever” violates rules shall be punished
by court-martial).
173. See Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. IX, para. 4 (giving Congress the
power to make “rules for the government and regulation of the said land and naval forces”).
174. 7 Journals of the Continental Congress 1774–1789, at 784 (Worthington
Chauncey Ford ed., William S. Hein & Co. 2005) (1907).
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In mid-December of 1776, the fear that the British might conquer Phila-
delphia led Congress to move to Baltimore and grant George Washington
“full power to order and direct all things relative to the department, and to
the operations of war.”175 By the end of the month, Congress went further.
Believing that “desperate diseases[ ] require desperate remedies” Washing-
ton had requested powers that he admitted some might regard as “too dan-
gerous to be [e]ntrusted.”176 Congress obliged, temporarily authorizing him
to raise sixteen infantry battalions along with three thousand light horse
units, three artillery regiments, and a corps of engineers; to set pay for all of
these soldiers; to request the militia from the several states; to remove and
appoint all officers under the rank of brigadier general; to take private prop-
erty; and, finally, to arrest and confine those opposed to the revolution and
those who refused to take continental currency as payment.177 A congres-
sional committee gushed that the country was “happy” because it could
safely entrust Washington “with the most unlimited Power.”178 The general
was gratified by a delegation that ceded powers “of the highest Nature and
[almost] unlimited in extent.”179
Subsequent congressional resolutions renewed some powers and added
others. For instance, Congress reconveyed the power to take property.180 Yet
this power was granted only for sixty days and exercisable only within sev-
enty miles of headquarters.181 In another resolve, Congress authorized the
commander in chief to try, before military courts, inhabitants who aided the
British (with supplies or information) and were captured within thirty miles
of any town held by the British in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Dela-
ware.182 Convicted civilians faced execution.183 Later, Congress made it a
court-martiable offense for civilians to kidnap Americans for purposes of
taking them to the British, when the kidnapping occurred within seventy
miles of the Continental or state armies.184
175. Journals of the Continental Congress 1774–1789, supra note 116, at 1027.
176. Letter from George Washington to John Hancock (Dec. 20, 1776), in 7 The Papers
of George Washington: Revolutionary War Series, supra note 116, at 381, 381–82.
177. Journals of the Continental Congress, supra note 116, at 1045.
178. Letter from Executive Committee of the Continental Congress to George Washington
(Dec. 31, 1776), in 7 The Papers of George Washington: Revolutionary Series, supra
note 91, at 495, 495.
179. Letter from George Washington to Executive Committee of the Continental Congress
(Jan. 1, 1777), in 7 The Papers of George Washington: Revolutionary Series, supra note
91, at 499, 500.
180. 8 Journals of the Continental Congress 1774–1789, supra note 174, at 752.
181. Id.
182. 9 Journals of the Continental Congress 1774–1789, supra note 174, at 784.
183. Id.
184. 10 Journals of the Continental Congress 1774–1789, at 204–05 (Worthington
Chauncey Ford ed., William S. Hein & Co. 2005) (1908).
As late as 1780, some wished to delegate dictatorial powers to Washington. In particular,
a delegate to the Continental Congress proposed that the commander in chief be given author-
ity to do whatever he felt was in the interests of the United States. See Letter from James Lovell
to Elbridge Gerry (Nov. 20, 1780), in 16 Letters of Delegates to Congress 1774–1789,
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When trial of civilians in the regular courts was possible, Washington
generally favored that mode over the use of the military courts.185 Nonethe-
less, the commander in chief repeatedly had civilians tried via courts-mar-
tial.186 Some received as many as 200 lashes, while others were executed.187
Contemporaries described Washington as a dictator.188 In 1780 and
1787, Alexander Hamilton—who had served as Washington’s trusted aide—
observed that the Continental Congress had exercised the “highest acts of
sovereignty,” including naming a dictator.189 In 1781, New York Governor
George Clinton noted that Congress had “invested a military officer with
dictatorial powers,”190 an evident reference to Washington. During the Con-
stitution’s ratification, Edmund Randolph and Patrick Henry noted that the
former commander in chief had enjoyed dictatorial authority.191 After ratifi-
cation, judges of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court praised Washington for
supra note 160, at 363; see also Letter from Ezekiel Cornell to William Greene (Aug. 1, 1780),
in 15 Letters of Delegates to Congress 1774–1789, supra note 160, at 527, 527 (noting
discussions of appointing Washington “sole Dictactor [sic] of America”). Some thought the
idea of “creating absolute Dictators” was “stupid.” Letter of James Lovell to Samuel Holten
(Sept. 5, 1780), in 15 Letters of Delegates to Congress 1774–1789, supra note 160, at 21,
21.
185. See, e.g., Letter from George Washington to George Clinton (Sept. 25, 1778), in 17
The Papers of George Washington: Revolutionary War Series 124, 125 (Philander D.
Chase ed., 2008).
186. See, e.g., General Orders (Apr. 3, 1778), in 14 The Papers of George Washington:
Revolutionary War Series 387, 387–88 (David R. Hoth ed., 2004).
187. General Orders (Mar. 1, 1778), in The Papers of George Washington: Revolu-
tionary War Series, supra note 186, at 1, 2–3.
188. See, e.g., Extract of a Letter to the President of the Convention of the State of New
York (Dec. 30, 1776), in Indep. Chron. & Universal Advertiser (Boston), Jan. 9, 1777, at 3;
N.Y. Gazette & Wkly. Mercury, Feb. 3, 1777, at 2, col. 4 . But see Letter from John Adams
to Abigail Adams (Apr. 6, 1777), in 2 Adams Family Correspondence 199, 200 (L.H. Butter-
field ed., 1963) (denying that Congress had made Washington a dictator).
General Horatio Gates, sent to Canada, was also seen as a dictator. See Letter from John
Adams to Horatio Gates (June 18, 1776), in 4 Papers of John Adams 319, 319 (Robert J.
Taylor ed., 1979).
189. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James Duane (Sept. 3, 1780), in 2 The Papers of
Alexander Hamilton 400, 401 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1961); see also Remarks on an Act
Granting to Congress Certain Imposts and Duties, supra note 89, at 78.
190. 7 The Writings of George Washington 442, 442–43 n.* (Jared Sparks ed., Bos-
ton, Russell, Odiorne, & Metcalf et al. 1835) (quoting Letter from New York Legislature to
Congress (Feb. 1781)).
191. See Debates of the Virginia Convention (June 6, 1788), in 9 The Documentary
History of the Ratification of the Constitution, supra note 89, at 970, 983 (comments
of Edmund Randolph); Debates of the Virginia Convention (June 9, 1788), in 9 The Docu-
mentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, supra note 89, at 1058 (com-
ments of Patrick Henry); see also Debates of the Virginia Convention (June 10, 1788), in 9 The
Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, supra note 89, at 1092,
1141 (comments of James Monroe).
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the “tender regard” which he showed to “the laws and liberties” when he
“possessed almost dictatorial power.”192
Some saw the congressional creation of a dictator in a different light.
Mercy Otis Warren, author of an early history of the American Revolution,
claimed that many at the time were “disgusted with the dictatorial powers”
granted to Washington.193 During the war, an Englishman reveled in the fact
that America had resorted to a dictator because it suggested that the rebels
had been driven to desperation.194
Significant for our inquiry is that the Continental Congress supposed
that it had authority to do what was necessary to prevail in the war with
Great Britain. Before and after the 1781 ratification of the articles, the Conti-
nental Congress believed it had more than just a narrow power to
“determin[e] on peace and war.”195 While this power could have been read
as no more than a power to decide to wage war (to “determin[e]” on it), it
was instead understood to include the power to prevail in the war that Con-
gress declared. Hence despite the absence of any enumerated powers to take
property, detain civilians, try them before military courts, or create a dicta-
tor, the Continental Congress confidently and repeatedly exercised these
powers as part of its power to wage war domestically.196
B. The Legality of Wartime Emergency Measures
As one might expect, some doubted the legality of emergency wartime
legislation, particularly the state measures. After granting the governor
broad authority, a 1776 Virginia statute declared that its supposed “depar-
ture from the constitution of government, being . . . founded only on the
most evident and urgent necessity, ought not hereafter to be drawn into
192. 2 The Papers of George Washington: Presidential Series 85 n.1 (Dorothy
Twohig ed., 1987) (quoting Address from the Judges of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court).
193. 1 Mercy Warren, History of the Rise, Progress and Termination of the
American Revolution 213 (Boston, Manning and Loring 1805).
194. See Debates in the Commons on the Budget (May 14, 1777), in 19 Parliamentary
History of England 241, 268 (William Cobbett ed., London, T.C. Hansard 1814) (com-
ments of Lord George Germain). But see id. at 270 (comments of Col. Barre) (denying that
Washington was a dictator because he only had power over the military and because Washing-
ton had denied the charge).
195. Articles of Confederation of 1781 art. IX, para. 1.
196. There is some evidence that a few members of Congress believed in a congressional
crisis power that extended beyond defeating foreign invaders. In 1782, a committee of Con-
gress proposed issuing an ultimatum to the so-called “independent State of Vermont.” The
inhabitants were to accept certain boundaries and be accepted into the Union. If they refused
the conditions, a military commander would impose “martial law” and punish the “refrac-
tory.” Though Congress never issued the ultimatum, it is suggestive of a congressional power
to use martial law against those who threatened the territorial integrity of the confederation.
See Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Jan. 22, 1782), in 4 The Papers of
James Madison: Congressional Series 38, 40 n.6 (William T. Hutchinson & William M.E.
Rachal eds., 1965).
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precedent.”197 Similarly, Jefferson argued that the creation of a dictator was
contrary to “[e]very lineament” of the Virginia Constitution.198 The example
of Rome and its dictators was inapposite, for the constitution lacked a “re-
siduary provision” that expressly permitted the creation of a dictator.199
Pennsylvania’s Council of Censors, charged with identifying constitutional
breaches,200 criticized the assembly’s 1780 imposition of martial law as a
“dangerous violation.”201
The question is whether such criticisms were isolated or were instead
indicative of a broader sense that sweeping legislative authority over crises
was unconstitutional. While definitive conclusions are difficult to reach,
there are good reasons to suppose that only a minority shared these
misgivings.
To begin with, consider the broader context in which these doubts were
voiced. In Virginia, subsequent statutes delegated broad authority to the ex-
ecutive, with no textual admissions of any constitutional departures.202 This
suggests that later legislators did not view broad crisis grants as violations of
the Virginia Constitution. Moreover, Jefferson’s denunciation likely
stemmed from bitterness. He probably sensed, quite accurately, that the pro-
posal to create a dictator reflected displeasure with his ineffectual gubernato-
rial tenure.203 On other occasions, when his personal reputation was not at
stake, he endorsed sweeping delegations of crisis authority.204 Finally the
criticisms of the Pennsylvania Council of Censors were rather mild. The
council admitted that the supposed violation might have been justified by
necessity, even if unlawful.205
More importantly, while the state constitutions separated governmental
power and protected individual rights, they are best read as if they permitted
legislatures to ignore many of those constraints in moments of crisis. The
structure of constitutional prohibitions related to emergencies suggests that
197. H.D. Res. of Dec. 21, 1776 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 1776), reprinted in Journal
of the House of Delegates of Virginia, supra note 96, at 107–08.
198. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia 126–27 (William Peden, ed.,
Univ. of North Carolina Press 1982) (1853).
199. Id. at 129.
200. Pa. Const. of 1776, § 47 (establishing a Council of Censors and charging it with
judging whether the Constitution has been “preserved inviolate in every part”).
201. Journal of the Council of Censors, Convened, at Philadelphia, on Monday,
the Tenth Day of November, 1783, at 166 (Philadelphia, Hall & Sellers 1783).
202. See supra text accompanying notes 120–127.
203. Jefferson’s tenure was much criticized and there was an investigation of it after he left
office. See Dumas Malone, 1 Jefferson and His Time: Jefferson the Virginian 360–66
(1948).
204. See id. at 360 (describing how Jefferson had favored granting sweeping authority to
the governor); see also Jeremy D. Bailey, Thomas Jefferson and Executive Power 61
(2007) (same).
205. Journal of the Council of Censors, Convened, at Philadelphia, on Monday,
the Tenth Day of November, 1783, supra note 201, at 166.
June 2015] The Sweeping Domestic War Powers of Congress 1365
legislatures were generally understood to have power to counteract rebel-
lions and invasions. For instance, the Maryland Constitution of 1776, rather
than granting a limited martial law power, constrained who could be subject
to martial law. It declared that “no person” except members of the armed
forces and the militia (in actual service) “ought in any case to be subject to
or punishable by martial law.”206 It thereby assumed that the Maryland gov-
ernment enjoyed a power to impose martial law even though such authority
was not expressly granted. The framers of that constitution likely under-
stood that absent the restraint the legislature could impose martial law on
civilians.
The Massachusetts Constitution was erected on similar assumptions
about the broad scope of legislative authority in crises. That constitution
never expressly granted a power to suspend the privilege of habeas corpus.
Instead it limited suspensions to a twelve-month period,207 a constraint evi-
dently made necessary by an understanding that the legislature otherwise
could suspend the writ indefinitely. Moreover, it also declared that “[n]o
person can in any case be subject to law-martial, or to any penalties or
pains . . . but by authority of the legislature.”208 Again, the provision did not
grant power to impose martial law. Rather it assumed that the legislature
could declare martial law and merely clarified that the executive could not.
The latter limit likely was added out of an abundance of caution, for it re-
flected the common view that only the legislature could impose martial
law.209
The sense that assemblies had broad emergency authority, derived from
a careful reading of constitutional text, fits with the practice described ear-
lier. As noted, Pennsylvania, New York, South Carolina, North Carolina, and
Georgia declared martial law or the equivalent.210 It seems likely that those
constitutions also were read as authorizing the state legislatures to take ex-
treme measures in times of war and rebellion as necessary means of defeat-
ing adversaries and maintaining the constitutional order.
In contrast to the handful who criticized a few state statutes, there seems
to have been no one who condemned the Continental Congress for exceed-
ing its authority. Perhaps the lack of censure reflected the fact that the Arti-
cles of Confederation contained no individual rights protections (unless one
counts its debt guarantee211) and lacked anything resembling separation of
powers.212 Yet given its limited grants of legislative power (it had but a hand-
ful), one might have charged the Continental Congress with exceeding its
enumerated powers when it authorized the seizure of property, indefinite
206. Md. Const. of 1776, art. XXIX.
207. Mass. Const. pt. 6, art. VII.
208. Id. pt. 1, art. XXVIII.
209. See Prakash, supra note 18, at 1407.
210. See supra Section II.A.1.
211. Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. XII.
212. See id. art. II.
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detentions, military trial of civilians, and dictatorial powers. After all, the
Continental Congress was limited to powers “expressly delegated.”213
Apparently congressional war powers were understood as quite sweep-
ing. In 1780 Alexander Hamilton declared that the Congress was “vested
with full power to preserve the republic from harm.”214 Its acts of “the high-
est” sovereignty—the Declaration of Independence, the creation of an army
and navy, emitting money, making treaties, and appointing a dictator—were
never disputed, he claimed.215
Was this “full power to preserve the republic” without limits? Of course
not. There were constraints arising out of the limited authority thought to
rest with Congress. The Continental Congress could not tax people; it was
forced to requisition the states to get revenue,216 making demands that often
went unfulfilled. The Congress also relied on the states to supply soldiers,217
a less-than-ideal arrangement because, though such requisitions were “bind-
ing” in theory,218 they were not in reality. Finally, Congress could not regu-
late foreign commerce, an authority that was useful in preserving domestic
war material for military use.
Still the fact remained that the Continental Congress had broad wartime
authority. Judging by the statutes enacted and by the absence of criticism, it
is fair to say that the Continental Congress had power not only to
“determin[e] on” war,219 but also authority to ensure that it prevailed in its
wars. In other words, it had concomitant authority to adopt useful and ap-
propriate measures necessary to ensure victory. Despite the absence of ex-
plicit authority, it could take property, authorize indefinite detention and
military trials, and make a dictator of its commander because these mea-
sures were incidental to the war power and useful to prevailing over the
British.
In sum, continental and state frameworks were read to grant legislatures
sweeping wartime authority. The Continental Congress’s war power was un-
derstood rather expansively. State constitutions were read to permit depar-
tures from peacetime constraints related to rights and structure, with the
legislatures serving as gatekeepers of crisis authorities. Using their wartime
authority, both continental and state legislators ceded vast authority to exec-
utives, including dictatorial authority.
Most of the era’s constitution makers (and most legislators) likely did
not believe that curtailments of civil liberties in times of crisis necessarily led
to continued restraints afterwards. They had seen other nations temporarily
suspend civil liberties—most prominently Rome and England—only to see
the liberties restored in peaceful times. The same happened in America, for
213. Id.
214. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James Duane, supra note 189, at 401.
215. Id.
216. Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. IX.
217. Id. para. 5.
218. Id. para. 1.
219. Id.
June 2015] The Sweeping Domestic War Powers of Congress 1367
individual rights reverted to their peacetime forms after the war. There was
no permanent resort to indefinite detention or military trial of civilians.
III. The Domestic War Powers of Congress
Under the New Constitution
With the advent of the Constitution, Congress gained a few important
crisis powers and lost little. The new Congress could impose taxes and thus
could support military and civilian establishments without petitioning the
states for funds.220 It also acquired authority over foreign commerce and
could impose embargoes that might help retain domestic supplies during
wars and rebellions.221 In the past, Congress could do no more than implore
the states to impose such restraints.222 Finally, Congress could provide for
summoning the state militias to combat invasions and rebellions.223
Congress lost some authority over the military. First, it no longer could
appoint commanders in chief because the president would be commander in
chief of all branches of the military and all the militias, ex officio.224 Second,
Congress could not saddle the commander with officers not of his choosing,
for the president appointed military officers, with the Senate wielding a
check.225 Third, though Congress retained sweeping authority to regulate the
military, the president’s veto was a substantial check on its exercise.226 Law-
making had gone from a unicameral process to something of a tricameral
one.
Despite these changes to congressional authority and the creation of an
independent executive, the emergency Constitution shared the same basic
structure as the many American frameworks that preceded it. The legislature
(Congress) continued to enjoy the power to enact measures necessary to
prevail in wars. By providing that Congress retained the powers to declare
war, raise an army and navy, and regulate both, the Constitution implied
that Congress could continue to pass laws needed to defeat foreign ene-
mies.227 Moreover, the grant of authority to use the militias to suppress re-
bellions hinted that Congress had acquired a general power to enact
measures meant to subdue rebels.
With the adoption of the Necessary and Proper Clause, powers that for-
merly rested on a broad reading of the power to “determin[e] on . . . war”
now enjoyed the foundation of a clause meant to make clear that Congress
enjoyed incidental powers. Under the “Sweeping Clause,” Congress could
220. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
221. See id. cl. 3.
222. See, e.g., 14 Journals of the Continental Congress 1774–1789, at 1007 (Worth-
ington Chauncey Ford ed., William S. Hein & Co. 2005) (1909).
223. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
224. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
225. Id. cl. 2.
226. Id. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
227. Id. § 8, cl. 11, 12–15.
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enact laws necessary to prevail in invasions and rebellions, such as laws au-
thorizing the concentration of government powers, the taking of property,
and the suspension of habeas corpus and some other civil liberties.
The augmentation of crisis powers likely stemmed from the deficiencies
of the old regime. Under the Articles, Congress relied on the states to supply
money and soldiers, a reliance that proved misplaced. The Continental Con-
gress also lacked authority to help crush state rebellions. Some historians
suppose that Shays’s Rebellion spurred the Framers to propose vesting
greater emergency powers in the national government and led some of the
ratifiers to favor the Constitution.228
A. The Case for a Domestic War Power
The Constitution specifies that Congress has “[a]ll legislative Powers
herein granted,”229 signifying that powers not granted by the Constitution to
Congress do not rest with Congress. As noted earlier, some think the ab-
sence of an express “emergency power” suggests that the Constitution never
cedes any crisis powers to Congress. This assessment is misguided, for it fails
to heed Chief Justice Marshall’s admonition that constitutional text should
be reasonably or fairly construed rather than “strictly” construed.230 We
ought to give the text the reading that it most likely bears and not labor to
read it in the narrowest way possible merely because such interpretations are
possible. Additionally, as is now clear, the rigid reading of the Constitution
fails to account for all that preceded it. If the rigid theory is correct, we must
imagine that the Constitution granted the federal government less crisis au-
thority than its predecessor wielded, even as that new regime acquired pow-
ers and duties with respect to rebellions. Prima facie, this is unlikely.231
The far more plausible reading is that the federal government—Con-
gress in particular—inherited the crisis powers of the Continental Congress.
Had the Founders sought to diminish the national government’s crisis pow-
ers, they would have adopted a Constitution that expressly provided as much
to remove all doubts. Imagine provisions in Article I, Section 9 that explic-
itly barred the use of military courts to try civilians and prohibited the con-
centration of federal powers in time of war. Moreover, had the Founders
meant to deny or disparage the idea of implicit crisis powers, they might
228. Robert A. Feer, Shays’s Rebellion and the Constitution: A Study in Causation, 42 New
Eng. Q. 388, 388 n.1 (1969) (listing works in which historians link the rebellion and the
Constitution); see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Stephens Smith (Nov. 13,
1787), in 14 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 464,
465 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1983) (saying that the president was made
too powerful because the “Convention has been too much impressed by the insurrection of
Massachusets [sic]” and that the Convention had set up “a kite to keep the hen yard in order”).
229. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1.
230. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415, 421 (1819).
231. Cf. 1 The Federalist No. 23, at 143 (Alexander Hamilton) (Lawbook Exch. 2005)
(discussing necessity of an energetic Constitution to the preservation of the Union).
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have reintroduced a provision that specified that all powers not “expressly”
enumerated were reserved to the states.232
Additionally, had the Founders wished to discard or disclaim emergency
powers, they would not have littered the Constitution with references to in-
vasions and rebellions. The Habeas Clause supposes that the federal govern-
ment may suppress both, for it envisions that the government may use
indefinite detentions to counter both.233 The Militia Clause provides that
Congress may declare when the state militias may be called forth to thwart
invaders and rebels,234 thereby hinting that the Congress has a generic power
to foil invaders and rebels. The Guarantee Clause imposes a federal duty
with respect to invasions and rebellions,235 thus implying at least some fed-
eral power to satisfy that duty.236 The Preamble speaks of a desire by “We the
People” to “insure domestic Tranquility [and] provide for the common de-
fence,”237 two ends that seem to speak to rebellions and invasions, respec-
tively. Because there is an explicit limit on domestic war powers (the Habeas
Clause), a provision that authorizes the use of a particular means to combat
invasions and rebellions (the Militia Clause), a duty to come to the aid of
states during domestic wars (the Guarantee Clause), and an oblique refer-
ence to suppressing rebellions and invasions (the Preamble), the Constitu-
tion should be read as authorizing the national government to combat
invasions and to thwart rebellions.
Perhaps most importantly, had there been a desire to curb crisis powers,
the Founders certainly would not have added an express clause—Article I,
Section 8, Clause 18—that strengthens the textual case for crisis powers. The
Necessary and Proper Clause bolsters the accommodative reading of the
232. Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. II (“Each State retains its sovereignty,
freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this
confederation, expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.”). The Tenth
Amendment lacks the adverb “expressly,” suggesting that the federal government has those
powers expressly or implicitly delegated. See U.S. Const. amend X.
233. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. More precisely, the Habeas Clause poses no bar to
suspensions when a foreign nation invades the United States. I do not mean to suggest that the
Habeas Clause itself authorizes detentions, as some have argued. See Debates of the New York
Convention (July 1, 1788), in The Debates in the Several States on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution, supra note 89, at 377, 399 (“What clause in the Constitution, except
[the Habeas Clause] itself, gives the general government a power to deprive us of that great
privilege?”). As noted in the text, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ arises from the
Necessary and Proper Clause.
234. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
235. Id. art. IV, § 4.
236. See 2 The Federalist, supra note 231, No. 43, at 60–61 (James Madison) (discussing
Guarantee Clause and noting that “a right implies a remedy”).
237. U.S. Const. pmbl.
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Constitution, for it makes what was implicit under the Articles of Confeder-
ation express. Whereas before someone could have caviled about the Conti-
nental Congress’s enactment of crisis measures, the Necessary and Proper
Clause neutralizes such claims.238
Consider federal authority in the face of a military invasion. Despite the
absence of any enumerated “repulsing” power, Congress indisputably has
power to enact measures designed to thwart invaders.239 Again, the Constitu-
tion repeatedly mentions invasions, signaling that they are a matter of fed-
eral concern.240 In repelling invasions, the federal government is not limited
to employing the militias and suspending habeas corpus merely because
these measures are the only ones mentioned in connection with invasions.
Instead, Congress, via the Necessary and Proper Clause, may take all useful
and appropriate measures to thwart invaders. For good reason, no one
doubts that Congress can use the army and navy to repel invaders even
though neither branch of the armed forces is expressly mentioned in regard
to invaders. Going further, Congress also may take property, delegate war-
time discretion to the executive, and, if need be, impose martial law.241
Under the right circumstances, such laws are necessary and proper to carry
federal powers into execution because they help ensure that federal power
meaningfully extends across the United States. Absent power to expel invad-
ers, Congress could not ensure that federal powers—executive, legislative,
and judicial—reigned supreme over the entire nation.
Likewise, though Article I lacks an enumerated “crushing” power, Con-
gress certainly may enact laws necessary to crush rebellions. The federal ob-
ligation to counter “domestic Violence,” a duty triggered by a state request,
238. I count myself among those who suppose that the Necessary and Proper Clause is
generally redundant in the sense that had it been omitted, Congress could enact laws designed
to ensure that federal powers were meaningfully implemented. See generally The Federalist
No. 44 (James Madison). Absent the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress nonetheless
would have had power to enact measures necessary to prevail in domestic wars, just as its
predecessor the Continental Congress enjoyed such power, albeit without as firm a textual
grounding. The Necessary and Proper Clause makes that power less subject to cavil.
239. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. Many supposed that defense against invaders was a
principle object of the new government. See, e.g., Roger Sherman, A Citizen of New Haven:
Observations on the New Federal Constitution, Conn. Courant, Jan. 7, 1787, reprinted in 15
The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 280, 280–81 (John
P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1984) (claiming that the “great end of the federal
government is to protect” states from foreign invasion).
240. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 15; id. § 9, cl. 2; id. art. IV, § 4. I do not mean to suggest
that invasions are solely a federal concern, for I believe that the states have concurrent power
to repulse invaders. Article I, Section 10 suggests as much. See id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (describing
what states may do when they are invaded).
241. Unlike some authors, I do not believe that federal power to suspend habeas corpus
somehow implies a power to declare martial law. E.g., J.H.A., Martial Law, 9 Am. L. Reg. 498,
507–08 (1861) (“The right to exercise one power [suspension], however, implies the right to
exercise the other [martial law].”). A constitution could grant the power to suspend the privi-
lege of the writ without also granting a power to declare martial law. Having said all that, I
contend that the power to declare martial law arises from the Necessary and Proper Clause, a
provision that likewise authorizes habeas suspensions.
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suggests that the federal government has the power to subdue rebellions.242
The express power to call the militias for the purpose of suppressing insur-
rections implies a general power to subdue them.243 The Habeas Clause pre-
supposes a generic power to quash rebels, as it merely constrains when
Congress may adopt a particular measure (suspension of the privilege).244
Again, in suppressing rebellions, the government is not limited to summon-
ing the state militias and suspending habeas corpus merely because those are
the only means expressly mentioned. Put another way, the partial enumera-
tion of certain means of suppressing rebellions should not be construed to
forbid the use of other means. During the Civil War, the federal government
committed no constitutional wrong when it used the army and navy to sup-
press the Confederates because such use was necessary and proper to ensure
that federal authority extended to all the states of the Union.
The federal powers to repel invaders and crush rebellions can be con-
ceived as two parts of a single “domestic war power,” a power to defeat
native and foreign enemies on American soil.245 This domestic war power,
arising out of the Necessary and Proper Clause and its interaction with the
provisions related to invasions and rebellions, authorizes measures necessary
and proper to implement federal authority throughout the nation. Because
rebels and invaders may thwart the execution of federal powers, Congress
may enact measures to defeat both.
To return to the language of McCulloch, when it comes to thwarting
rebellions and invasions there are legitimate ends—defeating invaders and
rebels—that are clearly within the scope of the Constitution.246 Laws dele-
gating broad powers and curtailing civil liberties during invasions and rebel-
lions can be plainly adapted to those rightful ends. And the “letter and spirit
of the [C]onstitution”247 accommodate emergency measures, permitting
them because they are necessary to defeat invaders and rebels.248
242. See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4.
243. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
244. See id. § 9, cl. 2; Debates of the Virginia Convention (June 16, 1788), in 3 The De-
bates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitu-
tion 449 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1861) (noting that if
there was no restriction on suspension, Congress would clearly have the right to suspend
without limitation).
245. Cf. Resolution of the Legislature of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Feb. 9,
1799), in 4 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution, supra note 244, at 533, 534–35 (saying that Congress had the “right”
to protect against internal and external enemies and that the federal government is “empow-
ered” to repel invasions and suppress insurrections); A Slave and a Son of Liberty, N.Y. J., Oct.
25, 1787, reprinted in 19 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Consti-
tution 133, 134 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2003) (claiming that under the Constitution
there will be a “power, and spirit, to . . . prevent encroachments, and repel invasions”).
246. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 381 (1819).
247. Id. at 421.
248. This power to take measures necessary to prevail in domestic wars is a sound, almost
unassailable, implication of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Though beyond the scope of this
Article, it also seems clear that there is a federal power to take necessary and proper measures
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Earlier, Alexander Hamilton made the same point about federal power
over domestic wars. Publius said one of the “principal purposes” of the
Union was “the preservation of the public peace as well against internal con-
vulsions as external attacks” and that “the persons, from whose agency the
attainment of any end is expected, ought to possess the means by which it is
to be attained.”249 In every case, the “means ought to be proportioned to the
end.”250 Having made the federal government the guarantor against inva-
sions and rebellions, the Constitution ceded it the means necessary to satisfy
that pledge.
The power to take measures necessary to triumph in domestic wars is
akin to the power to deliver mail, one never expressly granted to the federal
government but nonetheless exercised since the Constitution’s inception.251
When one gives power to a government to create post offices and roads, the
strong implication is that government may deliver the post.252 Likewise,
when one imposes a duty to defend against invasions and rebellions and
grants the powers to declare war and enact laws necessary to carry federal
powers into execution throughout the nation, the government so empow-
ered may enact laws useful and appropriate for prevailing in wars fought on
American soil.
To sum up, the Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes Congress to
take measures to ensure that the federal government triumphs in domestic
wars. The Constitution contains too many indications (the Preamble, and
the Guarantee, Habeas, and Militia Clauses) that domestic wars are a matter
of paramount federal concern to imagine that there is no congressional
power to take necessary and proper measures in order to prevail in rebel-
lions or invasions.
to wage and win foreign wars (where the fighting occurs off of U.S. soil). During a foreign war,
Congress may take domestic property useful to its prosecution, like steel and steel plants. In
Youngstown, all the Justices supposed that the seizure of the steel plants would have been lawful
if Congress had authorized it. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
Similarly, in the midst of a large-scale foreign war, Congress might suppress civilian consump-
tion of war material, thereby lowering procurement costs, again a necessary and proper mea-
sure for prevailing in war. Cf. Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 780 (1948) (describing
Congress’s power under the Necessary and Proper Clause in prosecuting war efforts to extend
to controlling “production and distribution of . . . articles . . . which have direct relation to
military efficiency” (quoting Charles E. Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, 2 Marq.
L. Rev. 3, 17 (1917)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). While U.S. troops occupy foreign
soil, Congress can also create a legal regime governing enemy territory because such laws are
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the federal war power, a power that implicitly
includes the power to administer conquered lands.
249. The Federalist, supra note 231, at 143–44.
250. Id.
251. See An Act to Establish the Post-Office and Post Roads Within the United States, ch.
7, 1 Stat. 232 (1792).
252. Martial Law, 8 Op. Att’y Gen. 365, 372 (1857).
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B. The Case for a Self-Preservation Power
For some, an assertion that Congress enjoys a domestic war power natu-
rally raises the question of what else Congress may do to ensure the imple-
mentation of federal powers. The domestic war power may well be part of a
broader congressional power to adopt laws necessary to preserve the United
States and its Constitution.253 While the existence (and contours) of a self-
preservation power may seem something of a digression, a few comments
seem necessary because some may balk at the collateral implications of ac-
cepting a domestic war power.
The Necessary and Proper Clause, the source of any domestic war
power, indubitably has a reach that extends beyond hostilities. If Congress
can legislate to overcome invaders and rebels because both are a threat to the
execution of federal powers, perhaps Congress may pass measures meant to
ensure that federal powers are executed across the nation, without regard to
the obstructing crisis—rebellion, invasion, plague, or natural disaster. If a
tornado thwarts the execution of federal laws in a locale because it destroys
that area’s federal apparatus, Congress may pass laws designed to revive fed-
eral authority. Congress might choose to use civilians to restore the rule of
federal law, or it might, if the situation warrants, resort to the military or the
militia.
The Constitution arguably presupposes a federal self-preservation
power, for it assumes that the federal government can counter threats to
itself. Consider the Treason Clause.254 Though the Constitution specifies
what constitutes treason,255 it never makes treason a federal crime. Nor does
it specifically authorize Congress to make treason a crime.256 Yet despite the
absence of an express power, the Constitution implicitly empowers Congress
to make treason a crime.257 Congress made treason a crime in the Crimes
Act of 1790258 and it has been so ever since. Similarly, despite the lack of
specific authorization in the Articles, the Continental Congress evidently
thought that it could punish treason.259
The source of Congress’s authority to make treason a crime is the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause. As part of its power to preserve the federal gov-
ernment, Congress may deter Americans from subverting that government
and hence may enact laws criminalizing treason. In the language of the
Sweeping Clause, laws criminalizing treason are necessary and proper for
253. See 10 Annals of Cong. 408–09 (1800) (claiming that the Necessary and Proper
Clause “expressly delegates a general power of self preservation” because it includes a power
“to preserve and maintain the powers delegated” so that they may be implemented).
254. U.S. Const. art. III, § 3.
255. Id. art. III, § 3 cl. 1.
256. Instead, it authorizes Congress to set the punishment for treason. Id. art. III, § 3 cl. 2.
257. See, e.g., 2 The Federalist, supra note 231, No. 43, at 59 (James Madison).
258. An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States (Crimes Act
of 1790), ch. 9, § 1, 1 Stat. 112, 112.
259. See 9 Journals of the Continental Congress 1774–1789, supra note 174, at 894
(carving out treason as an exception to the general immunities held by members of Congress).
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carrying into execution federal powers. The passage of such laws deters those
contemplating treason. When executed, those laws incapacitate the
treasonous.
Another provision that perhaps assumes a power to preserve the govern-
ment is the Third Amendment. It bars involuntary peacetime quartering of
soldiers in homes and nonlegislatively sanctioned wartime quartering.260 Yet
the Constitution never expressly conveys a quartering power. Although this
quartering power could be viewed as part of Congress’s power to “support”
the army,261 the better view is that, in times of war, Congress may take prop-
erty to carry on the war. In the language of the Necessary and Proper Clause,
the physical occupation helps carry into execution the war powers of the
federal government. This reading of the Constitution sensibly concludes that
it perpetuates the wartime takings authority exercised by the Continental
Congress under the Articles of Confederation, a takings power that, again,
was not specifically enumerated.262
Having made a brief case for a federal self-preservation power, candor
requires the admission that the Constitution’s text does not as clearly sup-
port that power. While there are many references to invasions and rebellions,
there are no references to other crises that might obstruct the implementa-
tion of federal powers. If the Constitution contained more clues that sig-
naled a generic self-preservation power, the case for such a power would be
stronger. For instance, if Article I, Section 9 imposed express limitations on
what the federal government might do in response to natural disasters, the
case for a generic self-preservation power to combat all manner of crises
would be almost indisputable. Still there is a rather solid case that the Con-
stitution empowers the federal government, via the Necessary and Proper
Clause, to take measures to preserve itself.263
C. The Influence of Context on the Scope of the Domestic War Power
The idea that there is a domestic war power (or more broadly a self-
preservation power) implies that the scope of federal power depends on con-
text.264 That federal power varies according to the circumstances has long
been understood. During the debate on the Bank of the United States, El-
bridge Gerry made this precise point about the Necessary and Proper
Clause:
260. U.S. Const. amend. III.
261. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 177, 180.
263. Some ratifiers spoke as if a power of self-preservation was a power enjoyed by all
governments and did so in ways that bring to mind the Necessary and Proper Clause. See
Debates of the Convention of North Carolina (July 25, 1788), in 4 The Debates in the Sev-
eral State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, supra note
244, at 37, 54 (“And it seems natural and proper that every government should have in itself
the means of its own preservation.” (emphasis added)).
264. See Gary Lawson, Ordinary Powers in Extraordinary Times: Common Sense in Times of
Crisis, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 289, 308 (2007).
June 2015] The Sweeping Domestic War Powers of Congress 1375
The meaning of the word “necessary” varies, also, according to circum-
stances: . . . if parts of the states should be invaded and overrun by an
enemy, it would be thought necessary to levy on the rest heavy taxes, and
collect them in a short period, and to take stock, grain, and other articles,
from the citizens, without their consent, for common defence; but in a
time of peace and safety such measures would be generally supposed un-
necessary. Instances may be multiplied in other respects, but it is conceived
that these are sufficient to show that the popular and general meaning of
the word “necessary” varies according to the subject and circumstances.265
What Gerry said about “necessary” is true of “proper” as well. Congress
may judge that some things that are improper in peacetime are quite
“proper” in wartime on the theory that in judging the propriety of legisla-
tion it likewise should consider the context. Everyone understands that while
swimming trunks are inappropriate attire for an opera, they are quite suita-
ble for the beach. The same is true for legislation relating to military trials
and martial law—what is improper in times of peace may be fitting in times
of domestic war.
Others at the founding noted that the Necessary and Proper Clause was
extremely useful during “exigencies”266 and a few noted that measures neces-
sary in time of war might be impermissible in peacetime.267 Much later,
Abraham Lincoln insisted that measures that are utterly unconstitutional in
times of peace could be wholly constitutional in a domestic war. As he put
it, he could
no more be persuaded that the government can constitutionally take no
strong measure in time of rebellion, because it can be shown that the same
could not be lawfully taken in time of peace, than [he] can be persuaded
that a particular drug is not good medicine for a sick man, because it can
be shown to not be good food for a well one.268
265. Debates on the National Bank (Feb. 2, 1791), in 4 The Debates in the Several
State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, supra note 244, at
411, 419 (comments of Rep. Gerry).
266. See Alexander Hamilton, Final Version of an Opinion on the Constitutionality of an
Act to Establish a Bank (Feb. 23, 1791), in 8 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 97, 105
(Harold C. Syrett ed., 1965) (“The means by which national exigencies are to be provided
for . . . are of such infinite variety, extent and complexity, that there must, of necessity, be
great latitude of discretion in the selection & application of those means. Hence consequently,
the necessity & propriety of exercising the authorities intrusted [sic] to a government on prin-
ciples of liberal construction.”).
One of the grounds for defending the Bank was that it would prove useful as a source of
loans to the federal government during emergencies. Id. at 124 (saying that a bank “in sudden
emergencies [is] an essential instrument in the obtaining of loans to Government”); see also 2
Annals of Cong. 1957 (1791) (noting that bank can lend money to government “in time of
sudden emergency”).
267. See, e.g., Debates of the Virginia Convention (June 13, 1788), in The Documentary
History of the Ratification of the Constitution, supra note 22, at 1228, 1239–40 (James
Madison denying that federal government could give up rights to navigation on the Missis-
sippi during times of peace but admitting that during “emergencies,” including war, some-
times it was “necessary” to sacrifice territory).
268. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Erastus Corning and Others, supra note 1, at 267.
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While the reach of federal power undoubtedly expands during domestic
wars, it is not without limits. While it might “have been a solecism, to have a
government without any means of self-preservation,”269 it hardly follows that
the government may do anything to prevail in domestic wars. The Constitu-
tion limits the domestic war power and it is worth pondering those limits.
For instance, suspensions of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
are constitutional only “when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require it.”270 When neither rebellion nor invasion exists or when
the public safety does not require it, Congress cannot suspend the privilege.
Further, it is possible that whenever either rebellion or invasion “shall cease
to exist, the suspension of the writ must necessarily cease also.”271
Additionally, suspensions of the privilege of the writ are only permissi-
ble when they satisfy the Necessary and Proper Clause—the latter clause
actually grants the authority to suspend. Hence, all suspensions must satisfy
not only the Habeas Clause, but the Necessary and Proper Clause as well. A
rebellion in Massachusetts would not permit suspension in Hawaii, unless
such a suspension was necessary and proper to “prevent the rebellion ex-
tending” into Hawaii.272
Some rebellions or invasions might require little in the way of extreme
measures. A rebellion might be so anemic that a suspension of habeas
corpus would be unnecessary and improper and hence impermissible, even
in the theater of the rebellion. Again, that the Constitution’s bar on sus-
pending the privilege of the writ does not apply because there is an invasion
or rebellion hardly establishes that a contemplated suspension is necessary
and proper.
Given that Congress cannot suspend the privilege of the habeas writ
except in cases of rebellion or invasion, it likely cannot suspend the jury trial
right except in the same contexts. The suspension of jury trial rights are a
greater infringement of civil liberty because a conviction before a military
court not only permits detention long after a war ends, it also makes capital
punishment a possibility.273 If a lesser infringement (detention) is con-
strained by a requirement of an invasion or rebellion, the greater infringe-
ment (punishment) ought to be subject to the same constraint because
either legislation must be justifiable under a clause—the Necessary and
Proper Clause—that conveys federal power in a context-sensitive manner.
269. Debates of the Convention of North Carolina, supra note 263, at 60.
270. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
271. Debates of the Massachusetts Convention (Jan. 26, 1788), in 6 The Documentary
History of the Ratification of the Constitution 1358, 1359 (John P. Kaminski & Gas-
pare J. Saladino eds., 2000) (Judge Dana of Massachusetts noting that though there was no
temporal limit on suspensions, the Constitution limited the “nature of the cases” in which
Congress could suspend the writ).
272. See Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Erastus Corning and Others, supra note 1, at
265–66.
273. See 10 U.S.C. § 818 (2012).
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For similar reasons, it seems almost certain that domestic military rule is
permissible only in times of invasion or rebellion.274
The general inquiry involves discerning whether a particular war mea-
sure is necessary and proper for carrying federal power into execution.
While the “necessary” inquiry requires a showing that some measure is use-
ful given the circumstances, the propriety inquiry entails a balancing of the
measure’s need against the constitutional principles at stake.
In the first instance, Congress must decide which war measures are nec-
essary and proper, taking into account the severity of the threat facing the
nation and the impact those measures would have on constitutional princi-
ples relating to federalism, separation of powers, and individual rights. Upon
presentment, the president must then determine whether Congress’s judg-
ment is correct.
Because the constitutional text sets up a standard (determining whether
some domestic war measure is necessary and proper to implement federal
powers) rather than an easily administrable rule and because war measures
are often divisive, determining whether a particular wartime statute is con-
stitutional will stir up heated feelings. Yet the existence of such predictable
disputes does not cast doubt on the claim that Congress has ample, if con-
strained, authority to ensure that the nation prevails in domestic wars.
D. Early Congressional Statutes
Federal laws reflected the sense that Congress could enact statutes that
helped ensure the efficacy of federal power. As noted, the Crimes Act of
1790 outlawed treason,275 a prohibition the Necessary and Proper Clause
made possible because treason undermined the federal government’s ability
to implement its powers. The Act also enacted other crimes, many of which
the Constitution nowhere specifically authorized. Included in this latter cat-
egory were bars on freeing federal convicts, bribery, perjury, obstruction of
judicial process, and misprision of treason (concealment of treason).276 Each
proscription helped implement federal legislative, executive, and judicial
powers.
The Crimes Act of 1790 was not the only early statute that helped safe-
guard the United States and its powers. Others are worth mentioning. In the
Alien Enemies Act, Congress granted the president the power to deport any
enemy alien upon a declaration of war or a planned or actual invasion of the
United States.277 While modern judicial doctrine frowns on laws that turn on
274. See Martial Law, supra note 252, at 372 (noting that if invasion or insurrection are
necessary to suspend habeas corpus, “surely that emergency must be not the less an essential
prerequisite of the proclamation of martial law, and of its constitutional existence”).
275. An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States (Crimes Act
of 1790), ch. 9, § 1, 1 Stat. 112, 112.
276. See generally id. at 112–17.
277. An Act Respecting Alien Enemies (Alien Enemies Act of 1798), ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577.
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alienage,278 expulsion of enemy aliens was a somewhat common feature of
warfare in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.279 Though Congress
had authority over naturalization and migration,280 it lacked specific textual
authority to deport. Nonetheless it had such authority over enemy migrants
because deporting enemy aliens (that might form a fifth column) was neces-
sary and proper to overcoming wartime enemies.
Congress also legislated to protect itself from crises, including domestic
wars. After a deadly yellow fever struck Philadelphia, leading to the deaths of
thousands, Congress granted the president power to summon Congress to a
place other than the capital when doing so protected the health and safety of
legislators.281 Such a law would be useful not only during plagues, but also
during invasions and rebellions. If rebels or invaders captured the area
where Congress was set to convene, the president could summon legislators
elsewhere. The law was necessary and proper for ensuring the continued
functioning of Congress.282
Legislation criminalizing certain wartime acts reflected an extremely
broad sense of congressional power to ensure the continued viability of the
federal government. Laws recreating the Articles of War for the navy made
spying for an enemy, in certain circumstances, an offense triable by court-
martial.283 Similarly, the army’s Articles of War made aiding an enemy (cor-
responding, supplying provisions, or furnishing intelligence) a court-marti-
able offense.284 Both of these crimes seemed to apply only in wartime
278. E.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971) (“[T]he Court’s decisions
have established that classifications based on alienage . . . are inherently suspect and subject to
close judicial scrutiny.”).
279. See Prakash, Exhuming the Seemingly Moribund Declaration of War, supra note 9, at
114–17.
280. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3–4; id. § 9, cl. 1.
281. An Act to Authorize the President of the United States in Certain Cases to Alter the
Place for Holding a Session of Congress, ch. 17, 1 Stat. 353 (1794); Prakash, supra note 18, at
1402.
282. In other plague-related laws, early Congresses authorized federal inspectors to help
enforce state quarantine laws. See An Act Respecting Quarantines and Health Laws, ch. 12, 1
Stat. 619 (1799); An Act Relative to Quarantine, ch. 31, 1 Stat. 474 (1796). There is no express
federal power to impose quarantines and some members of Congress denied that Congress
could isolate individuals infected with dangerous, communicable diseases. See David P. Cur-
rie, The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period, 1789–1801, at 227–29
(1997). But a federal quarantine power arguably exists as part of the commerce authority.
Without some federal power to regulate people crossing state and international borders, it is
hard to see how Congress could have authorized the use of federal resources to aid in the
execution of state quarantine laws. For an argument to this effect, see Edwin Maxey, Federal
Quarantine Laws, 23 Pol. Sci. Q. 617, 628–29 (1908).
283. See An Act for the Better Government of the Navy of the United States, ch. 33, § 1,
art. 12, 2 Stat. 45, 47 (1800) (providing in the naval articles of war that all spies shall be subject
to court-martial and may be executed); An Act for the Government of the Navy of the United
States, ch. 24, § 1, art. 35, 1 Stat. 709, 712 (1799) (same).
284. Congress reenacted the army Articles of War extant during the Articles of Confedera-
tion, see An Act to Recognize and Adopt to the Constitution of the United States the Establish-
ment of the Troops Raised Under the Resolves of the United States in Congress Assembled,
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(because they spoke of an “enemy”) and were written in general terms, sig-
nifying that they applied to civilians (even citizens) and not just to military
personnel.285 These were unique aspects of the Articles, most of which ap-
plied to the military only.
The Articles of War are important for two reasons. First, despite the
absence of a specific power to criminalize wartime collaboration, Congress
concluded that it could take measures designed to deter and punish those
undermining the security of the United States during wartime. It likely con-
cluded that it could deter and punish enemy abettors as necessary and
proper for the execution of the federal government’s powers.286 Second, the
reenactment of the Articles of War suggests that Congress believed it could
continue to use military courts to punish civilians in time of war. The ad-
vent of Article III did not mean that the use of such military courts to try
civilians was always unconstitutional. Rather the use of such courts could be
justified as a necessary and proper means of ensuring the swift punishment
of those who sought to assist the enemy in wartime. Like its predecessor the
Continental Congress, the federal legislature likely supposed that “in times
of invasion, the process of the municipal law is too feeble and dilatory” to
punish those aiding an enemy.287
and for Other Purposes Therein Mentioned, ch. 25, 1 Stat. 95, 96 (1789), and those articles of
war made aiding the enemy an offense triable before military courts. See 5 Journals of the
Continental Congress 1774–1789, supra note 116, at 799, § 13, art. 18.
285. Compare 5 Journals of the Continental Congress 1774–1789, supra note 116, at
799, § 13, art. 17 (applying prohibition to “whosoever, belonging to the forces of the United
States”), with id. art. 18–19 (applying prohibition to “whosoever”).
286. The interaction between these statutes and the federal treason law is a little unclear.
Only those owing allegiance to the United States could commit treason. Spying and aiding the
enemy were broader offenses because they covered foreign nationals. So perhaps Congress
envisioned that non-U.S. citizens could be subject to courts-martial for these offenses, while
U.S. citizens could only be tried in federal courts.
287. 9 Journals of the Continental Congress 1774–1789, supra note 174, at 784; cf.
Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Erastus Corning and Others, supra note 1, at 264 (noting that
“[n]othing is better known to history than that courts of justice are utterly incompetent” in
rebellions and that during rebellions a jury often has “one member[ ] more ready to hang the
panel than to hang the traitor”).
It is worth noting that in 1794, the Senate passed a bill that provided that those “warring
against the Indians . . . shall thereby become liable and subject to the rules and articles of war.”
Letter from Henry Knox to George Washington (Dec. 29, 1794), in 4 American State Papers
543, 544 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1832).
But the House refused to adopt the provision. Id. The Senate may have supposed that white
juries would not convict white murderers of Indians. See 4 Annals of Cong. 1254 (1795)
(Representative Wadsworth saying that no white jury would convict a settler who had mur-
dered an Indian even when evidence was clear, hence the need for military trial as a means of
taking away cases from biased juries). That is certainly what Knox supposed. See Letter from
Henry Knox to George Washington, supra, at 544. This way of thinking suggested that military
trial was a means of keeping the peace with Indian tribes because ordinary criminal trials were
ineffectual means of punishing those who massacred Indians. Alternatively, it may be that the
Senate wanted to act as if the white settlers were part of the federalized militia and hence could
be subject to military trial. That is how Madison saw the matter. See Cabinet Secretaries’
Report (Jan. 12, 1795), in 15 The Papers of James Madison: Congressional Series 441,
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A few thoughts on some notorious laws are in order. The Alien Friends
Act and the Sedition Act have few champions today because they permitted
high government officials to suppress their critics. Unlike the Alien Enemies
Act, the Alien Friends Act granted the president broad discretion in times of
peace to deport aliens.288 He could deport those he deemed “dangerous to
the peace and safety of the United States” and those whom he suspected had
“treasonable or secret machinations against the government.”289 The Sedi-
tion Act made it a crime to criticize members of Congress and the presi-
dent.290 Though the Adams administration never deported anyone under the
Alien Friends Act, it brought a number of prosecutions under the Sedition
Act.291
My aim is not to rehabilitate those infamous acts. Rather I wish to point
out that the argument for their constitutionality rested in large measure on
the Necessary and Proper Clause, and to assert that even if this argument
was wrong, it was hardly silly. In Congress, Federalists argued that the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause justified both acts.292 Outside Congress, defenders
made the same claim, arguing that the government could act against for-
eigners who might assist a potential invader and punish those making scur-
rilous attacks on the government.293
That Congress, in its early years, enacted laws not traceable to any ex-
press authorization in the Constitution is well known. In McCulloch, Chief
Justice Marshall made much of the fact that Congress criminalized interfer-
ence with the mails, arguing that the law was necessary and proper for carry-
ing the mail power into execution.294 What has been perhaps overlooked is
the extent to which Congress believed it could enact laws designed to ensure
the robust exercise of federal powers and the federal government’s continued
442 (Thomas A. Mason et al. eds., 1985). Madison further believed that this “forced construc-
tion” was contrary to the Constitution. Id. Whether House members opposed the idea on
policy or constitutional grounds is unknown. But the idea that settlers should be subject to
military justice never became law.
288. An Act Concerning Aliens (Alien Friends Act of 1978), ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570.
289. Id. at 571.
290. An Act in Addition to the Act, Entitled “An Act for the Punishment of Certain
Crimes Against the United States” (Sedition Act of 1798), ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596.
291. See John Ferling, John Adams: A Life 366–67 (1992).
292. See Joseph M. Lynch, The Federalists and the Federalist: A Forgotten History, 31 Seton
Hall L. Rev. 18, 23–24 (2000); see also 10 Annals of Cong. 408 (1800) (explaining that the
federal government has a power of self-preservation via the Necessary and Proper Clause); On
the Same Subject.—1799, in 4 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the
Adoption of the Federal Constitution, supra note 244, at 441, 441 (report of Congress
claiming that Congress must protect each state from invasion and that removal of aliens who
may help an invasion is “necessary” for the purpose of preventing an invasion).
293. See, e.g., Patrick J. Charles, Originalism, John Marshall, and the Necessary and Proper
Clause: Resurrecting the Jurisprudence of Alexander Addison, 58 Clev. St. L. Rev. 529, 538
(2010) (discussing Alexander Addison, Liberty of Speech and the Press: A Charge to
the Grand Juries of the County Courts of the Fifth Circuit of the State of Penn-
sylvania (1798)).
294. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 385 (1819).
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existence, including laws authorizing deportation of enemy aliens and laws
against spying for, or aiding, an enemy. Congress generally had the proper
sense of the Constitution. No less than its predecessors, the Constitution was
erected on the assumption that legislatures could enact emergency laws nec-
essary to preserve the government, a power that under our Constitution
stems, in part, from the Necessary and Proper Clause.
E. Commentary and Judicial Opinions
This is not the place for a survey of the views of early politicians and
commentators about Congress’s domestic war powers. But a few comments
are in order to get a sense of the sorts of arguments made after ratification.
If we look to legal commentary, most of it focused on who could suspend
habeas corpus. Few individuals discussed the scope of the domestic war
power, martial law, or the use of military courts to try civilians. Noted com-
mentators, including Professor St. George Tucker, Chancellor James Kent,
and Justice Joseph Story ignored these matters. Yet it is worth noting that in
the course of arguing that the states had power to thwart rebels and invaders,
Justice Story rejected the claim that Congress had an “exclusive power” in
that sphere, never pausing to question (much less deny) that Congress had a
general power to crush rebellions and repel invasions.295 Justice Story under-
stood what was implicit in the Constitution’s authorizations (Militia
Clause), limitations (Habeas Clause), and duties (Guarantee Clause).
Even during the War of 1812, the question of legislative power during
domestic wars remained somewhat suppressed, for Congress never tried to
suspend habeas corpus, much less impose martial law.296 But the matter did
not remain totally obscure because members of the military claimed author-
ity to rule by decree. In the waning days of the War of 1812, Andrew Jackson
declared martial law in New Orleans.297 His move elicited a rebuke from his
commander in chief. James Madison, speaking through his War Secretary
Alexander Dallas, denied that the Constitution authorized the executive to
declare martial law.298 But he noted that Congress might do so. “In the
United States there exists no authority to declare and impose martial law,
beyond the positive sanction of the Acts of Congress.”299 Dallas went on to
underscore what he meant by martial law: if a commander “undertake[s] to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus, to restrain the liberty of the press, to
295. 3 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 86
(Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833).
296. Reginald Stuart describes a few instances in which some local military authorities
imposed something like martial law. See Reginald C. Stuart, Civil-Military Relations
During the War of 1812, at 107 (2009). But Congress never suspended the writ or author-
ized martial law. See Matthew Warshauer, Andrew Jackson and the Politics of Mar-
tial Law: Nationalism, Civil Liberties, and Partisanship 42 (2006).
297. H.W. Brands, Andrew Jackson: His Life and Times 260 (2005).
298. Id. at 303.
299. Id.
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inflict military punishments upon citizens,” the commander could not cite
the “law of the land for the means of vindication.”300
Much later, the Supreme Court concluded that the old order, in which
legislatures could enact emergency statutes, survived the advent of the Con-
stitution. Luther v. Borden endorsed the view that state legislatures could
impose martial law, thus rejecting the idea that the institution that was quite
common during the Revolutionary War was now impermissible.301 While
Luther said nothing directly about the federal government’s ability to declare
martial law, it surely hinted that the federal government had the same au-
thority as the states:
[A] State may use its military power to put down an armed insurrection,
too strong to be controlled by the civil authority. The power is essential to
the existence of every government, essential to the preservation of order and
free institutions, and is as necessary to the States of this Union as to any
other government. The State itself must determine what degree of force the
crisis demands. . . . It was a state of war; and the established government
resorted to the rights and usages of war to maintain itself, and to overcome
the unlawful opposition.302
The opinion seemed to suppose that all governments had the right to “deter-
mine what degree of force” a war demands, including whether to impose
military rule.
The majority also dismissed the relevance of arguments that the English
Crown could not use military commissions to proceed against rebels. The
martial law commissions issued by the Crown before the Petition of Right
“bear no analogy in any respect to the declaration of martial law by the
legislative authority of the State . . . when assailed by an armed force.”303 In
other words, while the executive could not declare martial law, that had little
bearing on whether a legislature could in America. Like President Madison,
it seems as if the majority supposed that while Congress might declare mar-
tial law, the president could not.304
300. Id.; see also 33 Annals of Cong. 1020 (1819) (comments of Rep. William Henry
Harrison) (noting that only Congress could alter martial law). Others, in their rush to de-
nounce General Jackson, took positions that could be read to suggest that military rule was
impermissible even when authorized by the legislature. See Johnson v. Duncan, 3 Mart. (o.s.)
530, 538 (La. 1815).
It should be noted that while Madison admitted that Congress could impose martial rule,
it was in a context in which that precise question was not in dispute.
301. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 45 (1849)
302. Luther, 48 U.S. at 45 (emphasis added).
303. Id. at 46 (emphasis added).
304. See id. at 42–43. Justice Woodbury dissented at great length, arguing that the Rhode
Island legislature’s declaration of martial law was illegal under state and federal law. Id. at 48,
58–88 (Woodbury, J., dissenting). But on the question of whether the federal government
could declare martial law he equivocated. Initially he seemed to suggest that both the federal
and state governments lacked such authority because the authority was fundamentally incon-
sistent with “political or civil liberty.” Id. at 62; see also id. at 69 (doubting whether legislative
power in “this country” could impose martial law); id. at 75 (saying martial law was inconsis-
tent with “free government[ ]”). At other points, however, he conceded that if anyone could
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Finally, the case of Ex parte Milligan merits a few comments. During the
Civil War, the military had convicted Lambdin P. Milligan before a military
court (“a military commission”) at a time when the ordinary courts were
open.305 In dicta, the five-justice majority denied that even Congress could
authorize military trial of civilians.306 Chief Justice Chase, writing for three
other justices, agreed that Milligan’s military trial was unlawful, primarily
because Congress had denied the president authority to conduct such tri-
als.307 Yet he disagreed with the gratuitous assertion that Congress could not
have imposed martial law in Indiana. It is “within the power of Congress to
determine in what states or districts such great and imminent public danger
exists as justifies the authorization of military tribunals for the trial of
crimes and offences against the discipline or security of the army or against
the public safety.”308 The chief justice believed that such power arose from
the powers to govern and regulate the armed forces and to declare war. The
latter power “necessarily extend[ed] to all legislation essential to the prose-
cution of war with vigor and success,” including imposing martial law and
military courts.309
Chief Justice Chase was right, but ought to have cited the Sweeping
Clause as well. The Constitution empowers Congress to adopt measures nec-
essary and proper to thwart invaders and rebels, including, when necessary,
the military trial of civilians and the imposition of military rule.310
IV. The Domestic War Power and its Relationship to the
Separation of Powers, Individual Rights, and Elections
This Article has maintained that Congress has a domestic war power
and that it may authorize the seizure of property, indefinite detentions, mili-
tary trials of civilians, and military rule. The case for why Congress has such
sweeping authority largely has been made without reference to the Constitu-
tion’s principal features—such as the separation of powers and individual
rights—that might be thought to bar some or all of these crisis measures.
For instance, why doesn’t the Constitution’s implicit separation of powers
bar delegations of vast wartime authority to the president? Or why doesn’t
declare martial law, the federal government could do so because it was invested with exclusive
war powers. Id. (admitting that federal government might have power to declare martial law);
id. at 83 (recognizing that if either government possessed authority to declare martial law it
was the federal government).
305. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 107 (1866).
306. Id. at 121–22.
307. Id. at 132 (Chase, C.J., concurring).
308. Id. at 140.
309. Id. at 139.
310. See Martial Law, supra note 252, at 372–73 (1857) (arguing that the Constitution
permits martial law during invasions and rebellions and noting that legislatures have such
authority in England and America); see also Letter from Judge F.A. Chenoweth to William L.
Marcy (June 8, 1856), in S. Exec. Doc. No. 41 (claiming that martial law “never will legally
exist without the express provision of Congress”).
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the Constitution’s creation of seemingly unyielding rights, in the Bill of
Rights and elsewhere, mean that the existence of a domestic war has no
bearing on whether those rights can be made to yield?
This Part squarely addresses how Congress’s domestic war power inter-
acts with three of the Constitution’s most central elements—the separation
of powers, individual rights, and periodical elections for federal office—and
why extreme crisis measures can be constitutional despite these features.
A. Separation of Powers
For this discussion, assume that the Constitution has an implied princi-
ple requiring some separation of powers across the three branches. That is to
say, what the Constitution vests in separate hands (legislative, executive, and
judicial power) generally must stay separated, meaning that no one federal
institution may exercise two or more powers. Almost everyone supposes the
rule is immanent in the Constitution even as the degree or manner of sepa-
ration remains disputed.311
My claim is that notwithstanding this implied separation of powers
principle, the Constitution permits Congress to vest the legislative and judi-
cial powers with the executive, thereby temporarily uniting the three federal
powers. When arguing against a plural executive at the Philadelphia Conven-
tion, Edmund Randolph noted that the “[l]egislature may appoint a dictator
when necessary,” suggesting that the national legislature could concentrate
power.312 The principle of incidental and implied powers, made express in
the Necessary and Proper Clause, authorizes the creation of a dictator. As
Washington noted during the Revolutionary War, because “desperate dis-
eases[ ] require desperate remedies,”313 Congress may conclude that the con-
centration of powers in the executive is a “necessary,” even indispensable,
means of ensuring that federal powers are implemented. Congress also may
judge that concentered powers in wartime are “proper,” because as argued
earlier, Congress may judge propriety by reference to context. Given that “it
has always been the policy of republics to concentre the powers of society in
the hands of the supreme magistracy for a limited time”314 as a means of
overcoming a crisis,315 and given that previous American republics had done
so in the years prior to the Constitution’s creation, it seems fair to say that
311. For a discussion of how early statesmen dealt with this issue, see Gerhard Casper,
Separating Power: Essays on the Founding Period (1997). For an unconventional under-
standing of legislative power in the context of the need to keep it separate from executive, see
Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1721 (2002). For a defense of the traditional sense of legislative power, see Larry Alexander &
Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation Doctrine’s Death are Greatly Exaggerated, 70
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1297 (2003).
312. See 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 73 (Max Farrand ed.,
1966).
313. Letter from George Washington to John Hancock, supra note 176, at 382.
314. The Statutes at Large of South Carolina 1752–1786, supra note 96, at 470.
315. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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the Congress may conclude that it sometimes is necessary and proper to
adopt the age-old policy of republics and unite powers during extraordinary
times.
For those particularly skeptical about the constitutionality of delegations
of legislative power, perhaps a few additional comments are requisite. If ever
there were a needful and fitting occasion for the delegation of such power,
surely it would be in the context of domestic wars, when the nation and the
legal framework that helps constitute it are imperiled. There can be no more
compelling case for the delegation of lawmaking authority because if the
rebels or invaders prevail, they may extinguish the entire system of separated
powers.316
Different arguments help explain why it is permissible to permit adjudi-
cation in the executive branch during domestic wars. On some accounts,
Article III vests the entire federal judicial power in the Supreme Court and
inferior federal courts that Congress may create,317 meaning that the federal
executive cannot exercise judicial power because the Constitution grants it
exclusively to the courts. This suggests that Congress cannot authorize mili-
tary tribunals or commissions to hear ordinary, nonmilitary criminal cases
or to adjudicate disputes between private parties. Indeed, even if the ordi-
nary civilian courts were closed because of warfare, or even if there was an
acute need to provide swift punishment, there can be no federal power to
create a system of military courts for nonmilitary personnel because Article
III erects an insuperable barrier.
I believe that one should read Article III as establishing how federal
civilian courts should function, but as saying nothing about whether Con-
gress can, under limited circumstances, erect alternative courts. Dynes v.
Hoover, from the mid-nineteenth century, concluded as much when the
Court rejected the claim that courts-martial violated Article III.318 Con-
gress’s “power to [provide for the trial of military and naval offenses] is
given without any connection between it and the 3d article of the Constitu-
tion defining the judicial power of the United States,”319 meaning that Article
III had no bearing on whether military courts could try cases of desertion.
316. I thus disagree with Professor Lawson’s categorical claim that delegations of legisla-
tive power are per se unconstitutional. See Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88
Va. L. Rev. 327, 350 (2002) (“There is not the slightest doubt that a statute delegating legisla-
tive power would not be ‘proper’ and hence would not be authorized by the Sweeping
Clause.”). Were we to ask how “a fully informed eighteenth-century audience,” id., would
regard delegations of legislative power during invasions and rebellions, I believe that most in
the audience would find them necessary and proper. More congenial to this Article’s argument
is Lawson’s recent suggestion that more laws pass muster under the Necessary and Proper
Clause in times of crisis, meaning that Congress can do more in times of crisis. See Lawson,
supra note 264, at 308.
317. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two
Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 205 (1985) (analyzing Justice Story’s claim that
Article III requires all federal judicial power to be vested in federal courts).
318. 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 78–79 (1857).
319. Dynes, 61 U.S. at 79.
1386 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 113:1337
A parallel argument can be made about the use of military courts to try
cases that ordinarily would be heard in the federal courts. While Article III
addresses the features of the federal civilian judicial system, it does not speak
to (much less constrain) what cases may be adjudicated in military courts.
The question is whether the Constitution elsewhere empowers Congress, in
time of a domestic war, to establish military courts to try civilians. Like the
power to establish military courts for military personnel, the power to set up
military courts for civilians (if it exists) is “entirely independent”320 of the
judicial power of Article III.
In my view, the Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes Congress, dur-
ing a domestic war, to set up military courts to adjudicate cases that involve
civilians. The necessity and propriety of such laws is evidenced by the fact
that before the Constitution’s creation, military courts repeatedly adjudi-
cated cases involving crimes committed by ordinary citizens both at the con-
tinental and state levels.321 After the Constitution’s creation, Congress
declared that those who spied for, or abetted, an enemy (crimes that could
be adjudicated only in times of hostilities) could be tried before military
courts.322 Such legislation was necessary and proper under the plausible the-
ory that in times of war, swift and exemplary punishment of those aiding
the enemy could be expected only from military courts.323
At the extreme, Congress might wholly supplant the civil courts when
legislators conclude that those courts cannot function. For example, if civil
judges, marshals, clerks, or bailiffs have fled due to an invasion, Congress
might conclude that a functioning system of justice is indispensably neces-
sary as a means of reassuring the populace that the government still func-
tions. To satisfy that need, Congress could provide that military courts
would dispense justice in the interim. Or consider an area where judicial
personnel have abandoned their posts and joined a rebellion. If that area is
under threat of a rebel takeover and some judicial system is requisite, mili-
tary courts may be the only alternative.
In Ex parte Milligan, the majority concluded that when the ordinary
courts are open, military courts could not adjudicate the alleged crimes of
noncombatants.324 The focus on whether the courts are open is misplaced.
In deciding whether to bypass the ordinary courts, members of Congress
should be mindful of whether those courts are open and should consider the
types of cases that might be shifted to the military courts. But those are not
the only relevant factors. For instance, Congress may consider possible judi-
cial bias in the civilian courts (especially when concerned about rebellion),
the pace at which civilian courts hear and decide cases, and whether civilian
judges are as competent in cases involving the laws of war. Taking these
factors into account, Congress may conclude that it should bypass fully
320. Id.
321. See supra Section II.A.
322. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
323. See supra text accompanying notes 283–287.
324. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 127 (1866).
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functioning ordinary courts during a domestic war because it needs impar-
tial courts, swifter justice, or more expert judges.
Thus far I have argued that Congress can transfer power away from itself
and the judiciary and make a dictator of the president. But perhaps Con-
gress may transfer power away from the executive as well. There may be little
reason to suppose that while the Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes
domestic wartime legislation diminishing Congress and the federal judiciary,
it absolutely forbids laws that diminish the president. While Article II creates
a strong executive, little in it suggests that it alone among the first three
Articles is beyond the reach of Congress’s considerable powers during inva-
sions and rebellions.325
During a domestic war, Congress might weaken or constrain the execu-
tive in two different ways. First, and more speculatively, perhaps Congress
can temporarily supplant the president as commander in chief. It might have
such power if it thought the measure was necessary for preserving the pow-
ers of the federal government. For instance, if an incumbent commander in
chief proved a poor wartime steward, perhaps Congress could vest ultimate
control in some more competent military figure, say an existing general or
admiral.
In times of war, there is a long tradition of executives being eclipsed or
superseded by others. During the Roman Republic, a dictator would sup-
plant the two executive consuls and assume supreme control over the mili-
tary.326 In the Civil War, while some regarded Lincoln as having seized the
powers of a dictator,327 other voices claimed that a military dictator ought to
supplant Lincoln.328 Similar sentiments were expressed in the
Confederacy.329
Second, Congress might impose a conciliar check on the crisis delega-
tions it cedes to the president. When it comes to law execution and military
matters, the Constitution does not oblige the president to obtain either the
325. See U.S. Const. art. II.
326. See Gregory K. Golden, Crisis Management During the Roman Republic: The
Role of Political Institutions in Emergencies 11–12, 24–25 (2013). Roman law barred
the consuls from serving as a dictator, meaning that the consuls could not appoint one of their
own. See Clinton Rossiter, Constitutional Dictationship: Crisis Government in
Modern Democracies 21 (1948) (2009).
In 1798, John Adams made George Washington “Commander in Chief” of the army as a
means of invigorating it in the face of a potential French invasion. See Letter from George
Washington to John Adams (July 13, 1798), in 2 The Papers of George Washington: Re-
tirement Series 402, 404 n.1 (W.W. Abbot ed., 1998) (discussing George Washington’s com-
mission). Even though Adams had appointed someone who, by virtue of his past, would
operate with a good deal of latitude, this example is not entirely apposite because Adams
clearly retained constitutional authority over Washington. See id.
327. See, e.g., David Donald, Charles Sumner and the Rights of Man 26 (1970)
(Charles Sumner stating that Lincoln “is now a dictator, imperator”).
328. See T. Harry Williams, Lincoln and His Generals 212 (1952) (noting that there
was talk of a dictator replacing Lincoln).
329. See Wilfred Buck Yearns, The Confederate Congress 173, 226–27 (1960) (not-
ing that some members wanted to make Robert E. Lee a dictator).
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Senate’s consent or the assent of some other council.330 Moreover, in ordi-
nary times Congress could not require that the president seek the assent of
anyone in the exercise of his constitutional powers. Nonetheless, as a condi-
tion of granting extraordinary crisis powers, perhaps Congress could require
the consent of an executive council prior to the president’s exercise of them.
If, as argued above, Congress can make a dictator of the president, it is less
of a stretch to suppose that Congress might also be able to convey additional
powers to the president with the proviso that he first secure a council’s ad-
vice and consent.331
As I have tried to make clear throughout, the Constitution limits Con-
gress’s authority to tamper with the separation of powers. In particular, such
authority may be exercised when there is a domestic war, meaning that there
are rebels or invaders fighting on American soil. Relatedly, it may be that
Congress can delegate sweeping authority only in a theater of war, much as
the Continental Congress ceded geographically constrained martial law au-
thority to the commander in chief during the Revolutionary War. The un-
derlying (and sound intuition) is that while military rule may be requisite
around the vicinity of active fighting on American soil, it may not be neces-
sary and proper hundreds or thousands of miles away.
B. Constitutional Rights
Two conceptions of federal constitutional rights seem relevant to our
discussion of congressional power during domestic wars. First is the view
that constitutional rights provisions establish absolute bars, applicable at all
times. Professor Fallon gives the example of compelled prayer because he
believes that a law compelling prayer is per se unconstitutional, whatever the
context.332 If Congress enacted a statute that compelled prayer, as a means of
placating a foreign power that controlled a large portion of New England
and credibly threatened to decimate its populace unless the prayer law was
adopted, the prayer law would violate the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses of the First Amendment. Essentially, where compelled prayer is con-
cerned the circumstances are irrelevant.333 We will call such rights “unquali-
fied rights,” because they are insensitive to context, including the
governmental interests at stake.
An alternative view regards constitutional rights as context sensitive.
Rights are qualified either because some circumstances permit the infringe-
ment of constitutional interests that are ordinarily protected or because
those interests always must be balanced against governmental interests in
330. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; id. § 3, cl. 5.
331. This sort of delegation has the same structure as a legislative veto, except the veto
rests with the council rather than with Congress.
332. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Implementing the Constitution 78 (2001).
333. To be clear, I am agnostic about whether the right against compelled prayer is un-
qualified. I discuss the issue of compelled prayer merely to give an example of a right thought
by many to be unqualified.
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order to judge whether the constitutional rights are violated in the first in-
stance. Where context matters, we have “qualified rights” because the consti-
tutional interest does not invariably prevail.
The notion that all constitutional rights are unqualified and can never
be overcome, whatever the context, may be deeply appealing to civil libertar-
ians because it resonates with their priors.334 Yet if we ask which sorts of
rights the Constitution embraces, it seems quite likely that it contains both
qualified and unqualified rights. Both text and doctrine affirm as much.
Consider provisions that reveal that their rights do not apply in certain
contexts. The Third Amendment creates a right against the quartering of
soldiers in one’s home.335 Yet it also makes clear that quartering is permissi-
ble in wartime.336 Essentially, the amendment reveals that in wartime, Con-
gress may subordinate a homeowner’s interest against quartering to the
nation’s paramount interest in defeating the enemy. The Fifth Amendment
requires that those tried for “infamous crime[s]” must first be subject to a
presentment or a grand jury indictment.337 But it also implies that in “time
of War or public danger” persons in the militia may be tried for “infamous
crime[s]” without either.338 In this case, the right of a member of a militia
not to be tried without prior action by a grand jury is clearly subordinated
in domestic wars and beyond. Finally, while Congress cannot suspend
habeas corpus during an overseas war or due to a collapse in civil law en-
forcement, it can authorize indefinite detentions during domestic wars.339
Judicial doctrine also makes clear that certain rights are qualified. The
First Amendment’s Freedom of Speech Clause,340 as refracted by doctrine,
supplies an example in which governmental interests can overcome the con-
stitutionally protected interests of individuals. While a statute discriminating
on the basis of viewpoint is unconstitutional if the government lacks a com-
pelling interest, that same statute is constitutional when its enactment was
undergirded by such an interest and the means furthering that interest are
the least restrictive.341 For instance, if Congress suppressed speech critical of
a foreign nation because that nation demanded as much in return for ending
a war, that statute would be constitutional if there are no other viable means
of ending the war (surely the termination of a war counts as compelling).
334. Those who tend to see the Constitution in rigid terms are most apt to see rights as
uniformly unqualified.
335. U.S. Const. amend. III.
336. Id.
337. Id. amend. V.
338. Id.
339. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
340. Id. amend. I.
341. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395–96 (1992) (applying strict scrutiny to
a regulation that the Court had condemned as viewpoint based); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 412 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny to a law barring flag desecration). For a more in-
formed view of the test for viewpoint discrimination, see Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech,
Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2417, 2425 n.44
(1996).
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Some nontextual constitutional interests are also qualified. The Supreme
Court has said that confinees in mental institutions continue to enjoy con-
stitutional rights against bodily restraint.342 But the very case announcing
the right permitted the government to trump those interests. The test is
whether a health professional exercised “accepted professional judgment” in
concluding that physical restraints were necessary.343 If so, there is no viola-
tion of the constitutional right to be free of bodily restraints. One could go
on, but the point is made. As a matter of doctrine, some rights are qualified
in the sense that the interests they protect must be balanced against the
government’s interests.344
My reason for discussing qualified and unqualified rights is to make
clear that I do not believe that the Necessary and Proper Clause permits
Congress, during domestic wars, to overcome all constitutional rights.
Rather I believe that while some rights are context sensitive and hence may
be overcome given important enough interests, others are not and must al-
ways be respected. How best to classify a particular right is challenging, re-
quiring a deep and historically informed inquiry. While I leave a thorough
catalogue of federal rights for another day, a few tentative comments seem
appropriate.
Qualified rights include the freedom of speech and press, and I would
add the freedom of assembly because it is hard to suppose that the latter is
unqualified when its close counterparts, the freedoms of speech and press,
are clearly qualified. In other words, if discerning whether the government
has violated the freedoms of speech and press requires a consideration of
governmental interests in the suppression of either, it seems that the same
framework ought to apply to freedom of assembly, especially because the
right to assemble is associated with the freedom of speech.
The jury trial right must be added to the list. As noted earlier, despite
the absence of any express exceptions to the jury trial right, the federal gov-
ernment may punish soldiers and sailors without regard to that right.345
More precisely, if Congress wishes to make soldiers and sailors subject to
courts-martial, it may do so. For these individuals, the Article III right to a
jury trial has always been understood to be qualified.
Of course, ordinary citizens stand on a different footing. I think it un-
necessary and improper for Congress to subject ordinary civilians, uncon-
nected with the military, to military trials in times of peace or during
foreign wars. In such contexts, the need for military trials of civilians seems
minimal to nonexistent. But in a domestic war, Congress may conclude that
342. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319–20 (1982).
343. Id. at 321, 323.
344. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 Yale L.J. 943
(1987) (examining the widespread nature of balancing in constitutional law).
345. Compare U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.”), with Ex parte Milligan, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 123 (1866) (concluding that the Framers intended to confine the Sixth
Amendment right to trial by jury to those who must be indicted under the Fifth Amendment,
which excludes members of the armed forces).
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the rights to indictment or presentment and to a petite jury should yield.
During invasions and rebellions, Congress may substitute military courts for
civilian courts when it appears that the latter cannot function because of the
ongoing conflict. Rather than wait for the civilian courts to reopen, a delay
that may extend months or years, Congress might choose to have military
courts hear civil and criminal cases involving civilians. Alternatively, during
an invasion or rebellion, Congress might decide that even when the ordinary
courts operate normally, certain war crimes should nonetheless be heard in
military courts because of the need for expertise, quick justice, and secrecy.
At least some of the Founders understood that Congress might need to cir-
cumvent the jury trial right in the context of a domestic war.346
The list of unqualified rights certainly includes the prohibition on bills
of attainder.347 Bills of attainder were commonly enacted during wars and
rebellions as a means of punishing individuals without trial.348 Because they
were particularly associated with invasions and rebellions it makes sense to
suppose that the federal bar was meant to apply in both contexts, regardless
of how useful bills of attainder might be in defeating invaders and rebels.
Put another way, the Constitution does not suppose that bills of attainder
are ever necessary and proper means of carrying federal powers into execu-
tion. Some Founders might have thought bills of attainder unnecessary in
the sense that they were not particularly useful. A speedy military trial was
always available as a means of punishing the truly guilty. Others might have
thought that such measures were an improper means of defeating an enemy
because they punished without any trial.
More generally, we might say that when the Constitution protects rights
that were typically only relevant in war or most likely to be infringed during
war, it makes sense to suppose that these rights are unqualified. In these
situations, the right almost brings to mind a war, thereby suggesting that it
was meant to apply no less in wartime.
Another right that seems unconditional is the ban on ex post facto
laws.349 Consider, in this regard, George Mason’s objection to the bar. De-
spite the fact that Anti-Federalists clamored for a bill of rights, Mason com-
plained about this limit on federal power, insisting that all legislatures
inevitably enact ex post facto laws in crisis.350 Given that Congress likely
346. See Debates of the Virginia Convention (June 20, 1788), in The Documentary His-
tory of the Ratification of the Constitution, supra note 22, at 1412, 1418 (James
Madison noting that jury in the vicinage might not be possible as when a whole district was in
rebellion and noting that there had been “greater deviations” from trial by jury in America
since independence as compared to England). Madison was likely referring to the use of mili-
tary courts during the Revolutionary War to try civilians.
347. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
348. See Charles H. Wilson, Jr., Comment, The Supreme Court’s Bill of Attainder Doctrine:
A Need for Clarification, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 212, 216 & n.28 (1966).
349. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
350. See Objections of the Hon. George Mason, in 1 The Debates in the Several State
Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 494, 496 (Jonathan Elliot
ed., 1901).
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would enact ex post facto laws during wartime, the existence of the bar guar-
anteed that Congress would violate the Constitution, or so Mason insisted.351
Federalists replied that ex post facto laws were only required in a govern-
ment with a “capital [grave] defect,” implying that the new system was so
well formed that it would never need to pass such laws.352 Mason’s com-
plaint and the responses to it assumed that the prohibition on ex post facto
laws was unqualified, applicable no less during invasions or rebellions.
Finally, Congress likely cannot authorize the president (or anyone else)
to punish civilians during domestic wars without a trial. If the Congress
could empower the president to punish without a trial, Congress essentially
would be delegating a power to impose a bill of attainder by administrative
fiat. Because Congress lacks the power to pass a bill of attainder, it likely
cannot delegate such a power. This implied delegation prohibition perhaps
reflects the disquiet that attended instances in which a Southern executive,
during the Revolution, executed individuals without the check of a criminal
trial.353 In sum, it seems clear that the Constitution forbids laws that permit
summary punishment without any opportunity to be heard, call witnesses,
and dispute the law and facts.
Of course, some will find any limits on the power to prevail during
domestic war senseless and dangerous. Senseless because some will suppose
that the “means of security can only be regulated” by the nature of the
threat.354 Dangerous because “it plants in the constitution itself necessary
usurpations of power, every precedent of which is a germe [sic] of unneces-
sary and multiplied repetitions.”355 Nonetheless, for the reasons given earlier,
the Constitution is best read as imposing some absolute constraints on Con-
gress’s domestic war power.
My narrow goal has been to suggest that while some constitutional pro-
visions protect unqualified rights, other provisions safeguard rights that are
sensitive to context. Because context matters for the Constitution’s many
qualified rights, Congress, using the Necessary and Proper Clause, may enact
legislation during domestic wars that it could not enact outside that setting.
C. Continuity of Government
The Constitution does more than establish separation of powers, feder-
alism, and rights. It also supplies the means of selecting the president356 and
Congress,357 procedures that seem exclusive. Yet domestic wars can interrupt
351. Id.
352. See An Impartial Citizen VI, Peterson Va. Gazette, Mar. 13, 1788, reprinted in 8
The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 492, 493–94 (John
P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1988).
353. See supra text accompanying notes 104–106 .
354. 2 The Federalist, supra note 231, No. 41, at 40 (James Madison).
355. Id.
356. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1.
357. Id. art. I, §§ 1–5.
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those methods. In my view, the Constitution grants Congress, via the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause, the power to ensure the continuity of the govern-
ment.358 The 1794 statute authorizing the president to convene Congress
elsewhere359 (discussed in Part III) was an exercise of that power. To see
more of the outlines of such a power, consider hypothetical laws that help
ensure that the nation’s highest offices remain occupied.
For instance, Congress likely can enact laws designed to ensure quorums
in its chambers.360 The Constitution provides that when a vacancy exists in a
state’s representation in the House, the relevant governor may conduct a
new election.361 This process works well in peacetime. But domestic wars
may make elections in many states impossible. Given the House’s centrality
during wars and rebellions and the constitutional need for a quorum, Con-
gress can enact laws that provide for alternative means of filling delegations.
It might provide that an outgoing representative will continue in office if a
state cannot hold new elections. Where outgoing representatives are unable
or unwilling to serve, Congress might appoint someone else to serve a con-
gressional district. While such a power might be wielded to favor the existing
majority, that legitimate fear of self-dealing is outweighed by the need to
ensure a quorum in the midst of a crisis. That Congress might enact legisla-
tion that favors incumbents in no way proves that Congress lacks the power
to enact such legislation. Congress clearly may alter how states conduct their
federal elections362 even though this power may be used to favor incumbents.
Similarly, the possibility that a prevailing legislative majority might exploit a
358. The Founders understood that the supervening congressional power over state elec-
tions for federal office would be useful during an invasion. See Debates of the Convention of
North Carolina (July 25, 1788), supra note 263, at 54 (noting that because large states may
prevent elections, Congress needed authority over state elections for federal office); Debates of
the Massachusetts Convention (Jan. 17, 1788), in The Documentary History of the Ratifi-
cation of the Constitution, supra note 271, at 1224, 1226 (Judge Sumner noting that
congressional power to provide elections would be necessary if France captured a state capital).
But the power to alter the time, place, and manner of elections does not encompass the power
to decide that someone should serve in the House or Senate without an election, as when
elections in a state are simply impossible. The latter power comes from the Necessary and
Proper Clause.
359. An Act to Authorize the President of the United States in Certain Cases to Alter the
Place for Holding a Session of Congress, ch. 17, 1 Stat. 353 (1794).
360. The Constitution’s quorum rule, U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 (“[A] Majority of each
[chamber] shall constitute a Quorum to do Business.”), is best read as turning on whether a
majority of possible legislators is present as opposed to merely a majority of all those seats that
are occupied. The former quorum rule focuses on the chambers as institutions without regard
to the number of seats that are unoccupied for whatever reason. The latter rule focuses on the
number of members currently serving. For an argument that the Constitution defines quorum
in regards to the chamber’s current institutional maximum, see John Bryan Williams, How to
Survive a Terrorist Attack: The Constitution’s Majority Quorum Requirement and the Continuity
of Congress, 48 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1025, 1064 (2006).
361. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 4.
362. Id. § 4, cl. 1.
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domestic war to add members to its coalition hardly demonstrates that Con-
gress lacks power to ensure a quorum.363
Some might suppose that the Constitution’s specific methods for filling
vacancies are the only constitutional means of replacing members. But the
relevant provisions do not by their terms claim that they are the only means
of filling vacancies or, more precisely, that they apply even when holding
elections is impossible.364 Moreover, one can read the Constitution as requir-
ing state representation in the House and Senate, thereby creating a solid
foundation for congressional legislation meant to ensure such representa-
tion. For instance, the Seventeenth  Amendment declares that each state
shall have two Senators, before further providing that the Senators shall be
chosen by popular elections.365 One can read the Amendment as having two
independent requirements—equal representation and popular election. If
one obligation—popular election—proves impossible to satisfy, then Con-
gress should try to fulfill the equal representation obligation, because satis-
faction of one duty is preferable to failing both.
When it comes to presidential succession, the Constitution establishes a
series of rules. The vice president becomes president (or “act[ing]” presi-
dent) when the latter is removed, dies, or resigns.366 In cases of disability, the
amended Constitution supplies complex mechanisms for judging whether
the president is unable to discharge the office.367 Furthermore, Congress may
provide who shall serve as president when neither the president nor the vice
president may serve.368 The specific authority to create a line of succession
covers death, disability, or resignation, meaning that recourse to the more
general terms of the Necessary and Proper Clause is unnecessary in those
contexts.369
Article II, as originally enacted, did not address one difficulty. Per the
Constitution, the president’s tenure automatically ends four years after he
assumes office.370 The original Constitution never specified what would hap-
pen should neither the presidential electors nor Congress select a president
and vice president. In my view, Congress likely had legislative power to enact
measures determining who would serve as president when a presidential
election yielded no president or vice president. Congress had such power
because such measures were necessary and proper to carry into execution
363. The same reasoning applies to Senate vacancies. Though the Seventeenth Amend-
ment creates mechanisms for filling Senate vacancies, U.S. Const. amend. XVII (writs of elec-
tions or gubernatorial appointment), those means might break down during a domestic war.
364. See id. art. I, § 2, cl. 4; id. amend. XVII.
365. Id. amend. XVII.
366. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (amended 1967).
367. Id. amend. XXV.
368. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (amended 1967).
369. See id.
370. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
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the powers of the federal government.371 The Twentieth Amendment re-
moved all doubts about congressional power when it explicitly provided that
Congress may determine who may become president should a president’s
term expire and no successor be chosen.372 I believe this particular provision
was unnecessary as Congress already enjoyed authority under the Necessary
and Proper Clause to ensure continuity in the apex of the executive.373
If one supposes that Congress enjoys a generic power of self-preserva-
tion, one will conclude that Congress may adopt measures to ensure con-
tinuity of the executive and legislative branches in the face of any crisis—
war, plague, or otherwise. If, however, one believes that Congress enjoys a
more limited power to prevail in domestic wars, then one will read the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause as authorizing Congress to adopt measures to en-
sure continuity only during domestic wars.
Again, there are limits on the power to ensure continuity of govern-
ment. Congress cannot supplant the Constitution’s prescribed means of
electing senators and representatives when those methods function ade-
quately. The point is that measures necessary to ensure the continuity of the
federal branches can be resorted to only when the normal procedures fail.374
Conclusion
As I have argued elsewhere,375 the modern emergency regime has three
features. With the New Deal expansion of federal legislative power, modern
Congresses naturally claim a broad domestic war power. In the tradition of
371. In his fascinating book, Professor Ackerman recounts that the Federalists considered
legislation that would have appointed a statutory successor to Adams if it came to pass that a
majority of the House delegations did not select either Jefferson or Aaron Burr. See Bruce
Ackerman, The Failure of the Founding Fathers: Jefferson, Marshall, and the Rise
of Presidential Democracy 41–53 (2005).
372. U.S. Const. amend. XX, § 3.
373. Congress arguably exercised this necessary and proper authority in 1792. The 1792
act not only specified that the Senate’s president pro tempore would “act as President” when
both the presidency and vice presidency were vacant, it also specified that new elections would
be called to replace the acting president. An Act Relative to the Election of a President and
President of the United States, and Declaring the Officer Who Shall Act as President in Case of
Vacancies in the Offices Both of President and Vice President, ch. 8, §§ 9–10, 1 Stat. 239,
240–41 (1792). The new elections provision was not justifiable under the constitutional provi-
sion that empowers Congress to decide which officer shall serve as acting president. See U.S.
Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (amended 1967) (“Congress may by law provide for the Case of
Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President declaring
what Officer shall then act as President . . . .”). By calling new elections, Congress was not
“declaring what Officer shall” act as president but instead allowing the new election to deter-
mine as much.
374. The need for some limit to Congress’s power to provide replacement representation
is obvious. If Congress could provide for statutory solutions whenever there was a vacancy, it
could wholly obviate the preferred constitutional solutions to congressional vacancies. Put
another way, it would be unnecessary and improper for Congress to provide for the routine
replacement of representatives and senators; it only has such power in emergencies, when the
ordinary means have failed because elections are impossible to hold.
375. See Prakash, supra note 18, at 1425–28.
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Lincoln, contemporary presidents now claim sweeping constitutional au-
thority to adopt emergency measures, powers often said to arise from their
status as commander in chief. Finally, because the executive believes he has
broad crisis power, he never admits that it occasionally must take illegal
measures and seek public or legislative absolution for them. To quote Rich-
ard Nixon’s interview with David Frost: “[W]hen the President [takes crisis
measures], that means that it is not illegal.”376
The original regime had a different set of legs. Congress enjoyed broad
legislative authority to help the nation weather domestic wars. Though the
president was, for the most part, constitutionally impotent, he could exercise
the considerable wartime authority that Congress might delegate. And when
the president lacked statutory or constitutional authority, the executive
could (and sometimes was expected to) act illegally, with Congress able to
absolve the president’s violations.
This Article has focused on the first leg of the original constitutional
regime. While the Constitution seems to address emergencies only in pass-
ing, a careful and contextual reading reveals that it grants Congress broad
power to safeguard the Constitution and its government from invasions and
rebellions. Prior to the Constitution’s creation, legislatures, both state and
continental, served as the gatekeepers of emergency authority. Indeed, dur-
ing the Revolutionary War, these legislatures adopted a host of far-reaching
measures related to the taking of property, detention and military trial of
civilians, and even going so far as vesting dictatorial authority with
executives.
The Constitution never intimates that it departs from the established
regime of robust legislative authority to prevail during domestic wars. To the
contrary, it contains provisions making domestic wars a matter of para-
mount federal concern (the Preamble and the Guarantee Clause), that au-
thorize certain domestic wartime measures (the Militia Clause), and that
assume that there is power to prevail in domestic wars (the Habeas Clause).
Additionally, Congress, via the Necessary and Proper Clause, may enact laws
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers of the federal
government. Measures designed to crush invaders and rebels help imple-
ment federal powers because defeating both ensures that the branches can
exercise their powers throughout the United States.
The Necessary and Proper Clause ensures that the Constitution is supple
enough to allow certain short-term deviations from some of its ordinary
limitations and principles when doing so helps the Constitution endure for
the ages. Faced with a domestic war, Congress, like its predecessors, may
delegate legislative and judicial power to the executive, subject civilians to
military courts, and make a dictator of the president. This is the way that the
Emergency Constitution speaks with a “somewhat different voice”377 during
invasions and rebellions.
376. David Frost, Frost/Nixon: Behind the Scenes of the Nixon Interviews 89
(2007).
377. Rehnquist, supra note 28, at 225.
